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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the study described in this thesis was to investigate the structure required to 
implement and manage digital forensic readiness within an enterprise. A comparative 
analysis of different digital forensic readiness frameworks was performed and, based on the 
findings of the analysis, the digital forensic readiness commonalities framework (DFRCF) 
was extended. The resultant structure was used to design a digital forensic readiness maturity 
assessment model (DFRMAM) that will enable organisations to assess their forensic 
readiness. In conclusion, both the extended DFRCF and the DFRMAM are shown to be 
validated by forensic practitioners, using semi-structured interviews. 
A qualitative research design and methodology was used to perform a comparative 
analysis of the various digital forensic readiness frameworks, to comprehend the underlying 
structures. All the participant responses were recorded and transcribed. Analysis of the 
findings resulting from the study showed that participants mostly agreed with the structure of 
the extended DFRCF; however, key changes were introduced to the extended DFRCF. The 
participants also validated the DFRMAM, and the majority of respondents opted for a 
checklist-type MAM.  
Digital forensic readiness is a very sensitive topic since organisations fear that their 
information might be made public and, as a result, increase their exposure to forensic 
incidents and reputational risk. Because of this, it was difficult to find participants who have 
a forensic footprint and are willing, able, and knowledgeable about digital forensic readiness.   
This study will contribute to the body of knowledge by presenting an original, validated 
DFRCF and DFRMAM. Practitioners and organisations now have access to non-proprietary 
DFRMAM. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 
This chapter introduces the subject of digital forensic readiness, the research problem, and the 
subsequent research questions and research objectives. Digital forensics is the application of 
scientific methods to collect, identify, store, analyse, interpret, and report on digital evidence 
harvested from digital paraphernalia, so as to enable the recreation of illegal events as well as 
to anticipate prohibited actions that are disruptive to business services (Palmer, 2001). 
Digital forensic readiness (DFR) is an anticipatory approach that seeks to maximise an 
organisation’s ability to collect digital evidence whilst minimising the cost of such an 
operation (Danielsson & Tjostheim, 2004; Rowlingson, 2004; Tan, 2001). A particular 
structure is required to manage and implement DFR in an organisation. 
A DFR framework can be considered as a supporting structure to implement and manage 
DFR (Kohn, Eloff, & Olivier, 2006). Apart from all the legislative imperatives for the need of 
DFR, it is also prudent to invest in the anticipatory approach to reduce the financial risks 
associated with cybercrime (Richardson, 2005; Whyte & Claims, 2012).   
It is evident from preliminary interviews with financial services companies that 
organisations are dependent on digital forensics experts to develop the structure for DFR. 
This structure is needed to understand the scope and costs of a DFR implementation. The 
interviewed companies also stressed the need for an assessment model that will aid in 
understanding progress towards optimal DFR. The research question: “What DFR structure 
(elements or domains) is needed by financial services businesses and how can such a 
structure contribute to the design of a maturity assessment model that satisfies the goals and 
objectives of DFR?” is thus relevant, consistent, and appropriate in the current digital 
forensics environment. 
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Background to Research Problem 
Financial services companies are losing millions of rands every year as a result of 
cybercrime, illegal activities, and infringement of company policies. In the 6th 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Global Economic Crime Survey, it emerged that cybercrime 
is the fourth most common crime globally and South African respondents felt that the risk of 
cybercrime has increased since 2010 (PWC, 2011). Cybercrime is a financial offence that is 
committed with the use of the internet and a computer (PWC, 2011). 
An organisation or a government must improve its means to prevent corruption if it 
wants to achieve its economic and social objectives (Grobler, Louwrens, & Von Solms, 
2010a). Organisations have a responsibility towards their shareholders and employees to 
prevent or mitigate the risk of economic crime and to investigate instances of cybercrime and 
company policy abuse. A consequence of these breaches can be the negative impact on 
employee morale and the organisation’s reputational loss. However, organisations that do not 
have legally-endorsed means of investigating and building evidence for cases and presenting 
them in a court of law will not be able to comply. 
Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) is an anticipatory methodology that facilitates the 
logging of transactions, building of evidence-based cases and the secure storage of cases so 
that they can be presented in a court of law without any additional investigation or with 
minimum further investigation. Literature published on the topic suggests that Digital 
Forensic Readiness (DFR) improves the chances of a successful litigation (Rowlingson, 
2004). 
Forensic readiness facilitates the development of the security strategy for the company 
(Pangalos, Ilioudis, & Pagkalos, 2010). Whilst minimising the impact of security incidents, it 
also serves as a means to illustrate that due diligence was taken regarding information assets. 
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Forensic readiness is, and is becoming even more, a significant part of the Information 
Security Best Practices (Pangalos, Ilioudis, & Pagkalos, 2010). 
Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) can be implemented employing the following 
approaches: 
 Industry best-practice and standards (for example, King III, SOX, Companies Act, 
ISO standards, and so forth). The majority of companies build security architectures 
that are based on current best practices (Pangalos et al., 2010). However, these best 
practices do not sufficiently consider the importance of developing procedures and 
controls that will have successful investigation outcomes. Thus, the necessity exists to 
extend existing information security best practices to contain aspects of digital 
forensic readiness (Pangalos et al., 2010). Companies also have to consult 
organisations operating in the computer forensics and risk businesses or accounting 
firms such as the Big 4 (Ernst & Young, KPMG, Price Waterhouse Cooper, and 
Deloittes) to implement DFR based on best-practice. This could be costly, especially 
for smaller organisations or start-up companies. 
 Literature promoted frameworks (for example, a ten-step process for forensic 
readiness by Rowlingson, 2004). However, frameworks are not readily available and 
those that are available are not associated with any maturity models. 
Small organisations are more at risk for high rate and low impact incidents since their 
restricted financial and technical resources will most likely increase the effect on the 
organisation’s viability. For example, it is very difficult for a small organisation to pay an R8 
million intellectual property fine for downloading movies or music from a file-sharing 
website (which employees are inclined to do). The start-up company is even less likely to 
survive this infringement. 
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Barske, Stander, and Jordaan (2010) stated that companies usually suffer financially as a 
result of write-offs of unrecoverable losses because of lack of evidence or lack of financial 
freedom to obtain external consultants. The impact of such a write-off can be devastating to a 
small or start-up organisation. 
An organisation with existing digital forensic readiness should be able to measure the 
level of maturity of its DFR, and an organisation without digital forensic readiness should be 
able to assess its level of need.  
An organisation that cannot assess the level of maturity of its DFR is running the risk of 
losing control over it. Although aimed at project management, this view is supported by an 
article titled: “You cannot manage what you don’t measure” (Ramirez, 2002). The King III 
report recommends the assessment of all controls within an organisation and the 
documentation of such results (Grobler et al., 2010a). However, 
 Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) maturity assessment models are not readily 
available through literature. 
 Consultancy firms can manage assessments, but the assessments are usually based on 
security risks and these assessments are not particular to DFR. Preliminary telephonic 
interviews and e-mail communications by the researcher of this study with 
consultancy firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloittes, and KPMG indicated 
that some consultancies do not possess DFR assessments models, some complete 
these assessments as part of security risk assessment, and others use holistic 
approaches that focus on business processes and not on digital forensic readiness, 
which is akin to buying the dairy to obtain a litre of milk. This could be costly, 
especially for small or start-up organisations.  
 A Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) maturity assessment model should endeavour to 
meet the goals and objectives of DFR. In other words the assessment model and DFR 
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framework should align to the goals and objectives of DFR. Organisations spend vast 
resources in their endeavour to align the one or other entity (or activity) with another 
entity (or activity). The overall alignment model is an example of a model that seeks 
to align information technology with business strategy (Henderson & Venkatraman, 
1993). A similar model was presented by Luftman et al, and called the strategic 
alignment model (Luftman, Lewis, & Oldach, 1993). It is reasonable to conclude that 
the misalignment of entities that should be aligned has undesired effects on a 
business, hence, the resources used and the efforts made by organisations to align 
these activities, post implementation. It would therefore be preferable to develop a 
DFR framework that is aligned with the objectives and goals of DFR. Also note that, 
the assessment model that will be developed by this study will be aligned because it 
will be derived from an aligned (DFRCF) framework. These goals are discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this study.  
In summary, there is an increased risk for forensic incidents because of a lack of DFR 
assessments. Companies can consult external risk firms to perform assessments, but the costs 
can be considerable for small organisations. The absence of non-proprietary maturity 
assessment models exacerbates the problem as it means that small organisations are forced to 
employ costly assessment models, based on security best practice, that are not necessarily 
focused on DFR. This study aims to extend the DFR commonalities framework to develop a 
DFR maturity assessment model for financial services organisations.  
Statement of the Research Problem 
Financial services organisations that do not have a means to assess their digital forensic 
readiness increase their exposure to forensic incidents, furthermore, organisations that do 
perform DFR assessments, utilise frameworks that do not exclusively satisfy the goals and 
objectives of DFR. 
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Research Question 
In accordance with the identified problem, the main research question is established as 
What DFR structure (elements or domains) is needed by financial services businesses 
and how can such a structure contribute to the design of a maturity assessment model 
that satisfies the goals and objectives of DFR? 
Research Sub-Questions 
Based on the research question, the research sub-questions are formulated as 
 What are the objectives and goals of DFR? 
 Which frameworks are used to implement DFR and what are the domains of a DFR 
framework?  
 Which maturity assessment model can be used to assess DFR?  
 What principles must be considered in the design of a DFR maturity assessment 
model?    
Research Objectives 
The following are the research objectives for this study: 
 To investigate the goals and objectives of DFR. 
 To investigate the DFR frameworks and their domains. 
 Determine which maturity assessment models can be utilised to assess DFR. 
 Determine the design principles of a maturity assessment model. 
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Contribution of the Research 
Practical Contributions: 
 Financial services companies will have a verified/validated DFR framework that will 
assist them to understand the scope of digital forensic readiness. 
 Financial services companies and digital forensic specialists will have a 
verified/validated maturity assessment model that will enable them to assess their 
forensic maturity.  
Academic Contributions: 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge of digital forensics by presenting 
findings that illustrate the comparative results of various DFR frameworks, 
This chapter introduced the research problem and explicated the significance of the 
problem. The chapter concluded by listing the research sub-questions, research objectives, 
and the contribution this study will have for academia, researchers, and practitioners. In the 
next chapter, a review of the literature that has been published on the topic is offered to assist 
in understanding how the research problem can be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter is three-fold. The first four sections of this chapter are devoted to 
investigating the objectives and goals of DFR, followed by an overview of available DFR 
frameworks. The next two sections present the comparative analysis of two frameworks and 
the findings thereof. The remainder of the chapter provides a discussion of the principles and 
objectives of maturity models, their application as DFR maturity assessment models, and the 
maturity model design principles.  
The Objectives and Goals of Digital Forensic Readiness 
Historical Overview of the Origins of DFR. 
The concept of forensic readiness was first introduced by Tan (2001) in his article titled 
“Forensic Readiness”. Tan (2001) recorded the objective of forensic readiness as the ability 
to capitalise on the usefulness of incidence evidence, whilst minimising the costs associated 
with an incident investigation. This concept was driven by a necessity to establish the 
feasibility of an incident investigation and the need to reduce the time of an investigation. In 
this article, Tan (2001) does not differentiate between (a) a definition of DFR (meaning of 
DFR) and (b) the objectives (what it aims to achieve) of DFR. In fact, the author does not 
define forensic readiness but chooses to focus on the objectives. These objectives are then 
regarded and used interchangeably as both the definition for DFR and the objectives of DFR. 
In 2004, Rowlingson expanded on the concept of DFR by advocating the need to collect 
credible evidence (Rowlingson, 2004). It is not merely sufficient to collect evidence for the 
sake of it, but the evidence must withstand the scrutiny of a litigation process in the event of a 
forensic transgression (Grobler, Louwrens, & Von Solms, 2010b). Pro-active digital forensics 
was introduced into the forensic readiness domain by Bradford in 2004. Bradford et al. 
postulated that all preventative security measures that must be taken by a computer system 
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must form part of DFR (Bradford, Brown, Perdue, & Self, 2004). Their article proposed that 
forensics should not just be aimed at data changes but also be aimed at identifying the 
behavioural changes of the computer user
1
. The objective of this approach is to create 
sufficient data to enable forensic investigators to gain a better understanding of the issues and 
behaviours of perpetrators. 
The concept of DFR was further extended in 2010 by Grobler et al. (2010b) by ensuring 
that the IT and information security governance programmes are incorporated in DFR. This 
concept aimed to enhance governance programmes by assessing the effectiveness of controls. 
Their article postulated that the controls that measure the IT and information security 
governance must be guided by best practices such as Sarbanes-Oxley and King III. Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) is an Act (promulgated in the USA in 2002 after the collapse of Enron) 
designed to ensure accuracy, reliability, and transparency in corporate disclosure, and the 
King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (King III) is a code of corporate 
governance for South Africa (Saica, 2013; SOX, 2013).  
However, as with previous authors such as Tan (2001) and Rowlingson (2004), who 
only briefly mention the governance and best practice aspects, Grobler et al. (2010b) also 
only provide a brief overview. Proper in-depth discussions and applicability of various 
organisational governance and best practices are not presented in their study. However, their 
study emphasised the use of DF tools to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of IT and 
information security performance of an organisation. 
Grobler et al. (2010b) also extend the definition of digital forensics (and by association, 
the objectives) from maximising the potential to use digital evidence to maximising the 
                                                 
1
 The user in the context of this research is classified as a human being who operates a 
computer device. 
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potential to use comprehensive digital evidence (CDE)
2
. Effectively, CDE better describes 
what Rowlingson (2004) proposed with “credible” evidence, in the sense that it outlines key 
requirements that must be sought in the process of collecting evidence. The following 
requirements must be met by a forensic readiness evidence collection process: (a) evidence 
has to link the attacker to the incident, (b) evidence must be relevant and sufficient for root 
cause analysis, (c) evidence must bear prosecuting weight in a court of law and (d) evidence 
must lead to a positive prosecution of the transgressor. 
In another study by Grobler et al. (2010a), the authors conclude that literature existing up 
to then does not adequately consider the utilisation of DF tools in the enhancement of 
organisational structures. Existing literature also fails to properly define and investigate 
“live3” forensics.   
Pangalos Ilioudis, and Pagkalos (2010) advocated the need to extend the range of 
forensics to envelop the entire information security domain. The idea is to apply forensic 
readiness to all auditing, monitoring, and investigatory activities. The need for forensic 
readiness to engulf information security is because forensics are, to date, only applied to less 
than 30% of business security incidents. This means that the bulk of cases do not end up in 
court. Nevertheless, the contravention of the corporate security policy (in all cases) with or 
without legal implications should still be investigated. The figure of 30% is based on a survey 
compiled by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) in 2007 for US-based organisations that 
are members of CSI. 
                                                 
2
 Grobler et al. (2010a) define CDE as “digital evidence that will have evidentiary weight in a 
court of law and that contains all the evidence necessary (relevant and sufficient) to 
determine the root-cause of the incident, link the attacker to the incident and will result in a 
successful prosecution of the perpetrator”. 
3
 “Live” is also called “real” time and it is the ability to capture evidence when a system is 
active (Grobler et al., 2010a). 
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In this study, the objectives and goals of digital forensic readiness, as derived from the 
relevant literature consulted, are summarised in Table 1: 
Table 1 
Goals and Objectives of DFR 
No Goals and objectives of digital forensic readiness Reference 
1 
To maximise an environment’s (processes, procedures, 
technologies) ability to harvest credible evidence. 
Tan, 2001; Grobler et al., 
2010b 
2 
To maximise the potential to use comprehensive digital 
evidence. 
Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
3 
To minimise the cost of forensics during an incident 
response. 
Tan, 2001 
4 
To gather evidence targeting the potential crimes and 
disputes that may adversely impact an organisation. 
Rowlingson, 2004 
5 
To prevent anti-forensic activities. Grobler, et al., 2010a; 
Grobler, et al., 2010b 
6 
To enhance the performance of IT & Info sec with DF 
tools in an organisation. 
Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
7 
To demonstrate good governance by assessing the 
effectiveness of controls. 
Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
8 To create proper data for good investigation leads. Bradford et al., 2004 
9 
To gather admissible evidence legally and without 
interfering with business processes. 
Pangalos et al., 2010 
10 
To allow an investigation to proceed at a cost in 
proportion to the incident. 
Pangalos et al., 2010 
11 
To minimise interruption to the business from any 
investigation. 
Pangalos, et al., 2010 
12 
To ensure that evidence makes a positive impact on the 
outcome of any legal action. 
Pangalos et al., 2010 
(Source: Author) 
The Frameworks for Implementation and Management of DFR 
There are several digital forensic readiness frameworks; however, because of the distinct 
focus of this study, only six DFR frameworks met the criteria for this study. The criteria used 
for inclusion are as follow: 
 The framework must be part of academic literature. 
 The framework must be applicable to computer or digital forensics. 
 The framework must focus on digital forensic readiness. 
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The six frameworks that met these criteria are shown in Table 2, below: 
Table 2 
Digital Forensic Readiness frameworks  
Literature Framework Research approach Reference 
The need for a structured 
approach to digital forensic 
readiness 
The structured approach  No explicit approach was 
indicated in the article, 
however the study implies 
that a qualitative approach 
was followed to understand 
the DFR needs of an 
organisation 
Danielsson & 
Tjostheim, 
2004 
A Ten Step Process for 
Forensic Readiness 
The ten-step process No explicit approach was 
indicated in the article, 
however the study implies 
that a qualitative approach 
was followed to understand 
the DFR needs of an 
organisation 
Rowlingson,  
2004 
A Digital Forensic 
Readiness Framework for 
South African SME’s 
Untitled (It will be named the 
Barske, et al framework for 
the purposes of this research) 
No explicit approach was 
indicated in the article, 
however a thematic analysis 
was performed to categorise 
DFR aspects, this type of 
analysis is indicative of a 
qualitative approach 
Barske et al., 
2010 
A Framework to Guide  
the Implementation of 
Proactive Digital Forensics 
in Organisations 
The DF Management 
Framework (DFMF)  
No explicit approach was 
indicated in the article, 
however the study seeks 
answers to the questions of 
“why, how, when, where, 
what and who”. This paper 
argues that a qualitative 
approach was utilised to 
answer these types of 
questions especially since the 
answers were descriptive and 
rich. 
Grobler et al., 
2010a 
Towards a Digital Forensic 
Readiness Framework for 
Public Key Infrastructure 
Systems 
Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) 
No explicit approach was 
indicated in the article, 
however the study implies 
that a qualitative approach 
was followed to understand 
the DFR needs of an 
organisation 
Valjarevic & 
Venter, 2011 
The State of Forensic 
Readiness of Financial 
Services Companies in 
South Africa 
DFR commonalities 
framework (DFRCF)  
A mixed method was utilised 
in this study. 
Whyte & 
Claims, 2012 
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Further examination of the frameworks revealed that 
 The structured approach and the ten-step process frameworks were already 
investigated and incorporated in the DFR commonalities framework (Whyte & 
Claims, 2012). These two frameworks were thus excluded from this study as the 
DFRCF already harnessed the best of both. It is sufficient to note, in summary, that 
the structured approach 
1. excludes DFR training from its approach 
2. does not have an incident escalation policy 
3. does not have guidelines, policies, and procedures for evidence management,  
4. and does not consider awareness around DFR policies and the penalties for 
non-compliance. 
On the other hand, the ten-step process  
1. excludes the methodology for evidence collection and storage, 
2. does not consider the criteria for incident reporting nor does it propose a 
standard for stakeholder engagement during incident investigations, 
3. does not have guidelines, policies, and procedures for evidence management,  
4. and does not consider awareness around DFR policies and the penalties for 
non-compliance. 
 The Barske et al. (2010) framework is similar to the DFRCF because both studies 
examined and incorporated findings as described in the unpublished article: “The case 
for digital forensic readiness” (Jordaan, 2009). This study will exclude the Barske et 
al. framework for the above reason and because the Barske et al. framework is limited 
in scope, compared to the DFRCF that investigated three frameworks in total, whereas 
the Barske et al. (2010) framework investigated only one framework.  
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 The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) framework is designed specifically for digital 
certificates and message encryption and it aims to improve the information system 
security of a PKI system. This study does not have the above focus and thus the PKI 
framework will be excluded from this study.  
Because of the exclusion of the above frameworks, only the DFRCF and the DFMF 
frameworks will be investigated in this study. An overview of the DFRCF and DFMF 
frameworks follows, as well as a comparative analysis that initiates the extension of the 
DFRCF.  
Digital Forensics Readiness Commonalities Framework (DFRCF) 
Figure 1 below illustrates the major domains of the DFRCF and their interrelationships. The 
arrows indicate a flow or steps that guide the development and implementation of DFR in 
organisations. Typically, organisations need to articulate their DFR strategy, which, in turn, 
informs the forensic-need methodology. The next step ensures the identification of systems 
and events that house the forensic evidence. Policies to guide the data collection and 
compliance will be developed after systems have been identified. Staff will have to be trained 
to manage forensic evidence and this step leads to the development of monitoring reports and 
protocol. As can be seen, the framework advocates the utilisation and approval of legal 
experts throughout the entire process.   
It is clear from the above brief description that the domains are interlinked and each has 
to be acted on to ensure a holistic approach. 
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Figure 1: DFR Commonalities framework (Source: Whyte & Claims, 2012) 
In the following section, the domains of the DFRC framework are delineated: 
Strategy 
The purpose of this domain is to ensure that the organisation has a DFR strategy and that it 
has constructed a technique to evaluate the need for evidence collection.  
This Digital Forensic Readiness Commonalities Framework (DFRCF) domain is also 
supported in the reviewed literature. The domain emphasises the need for a strategic mandate 
from executive management to implement and maintain digital forensic readiness (Grobler et 
al., 2010a). A strategy communicated from this level will ensure top management 
commitment and will promote the DFR framework downwards. It also ensures that resources 
and finances are allocated to facilitate DFR. 
The framework suggests that the implementation of this particular domain can assist 
with the realisation of a DF strategy and an evidence-collection statement to enable the 
alignment of business risk units with incident-monitoring units (Whyte & Claims, 2012) 
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Methodology 
The purpose of this domain is to ensure the selection of a methodology that will enable the 
collection of comprehensive evidence as well as develop guidelines that will facilitate the 
secure storage and handling of evidence for cases (Jordaan, 2009). This methodology will 
inform the techniques that can be employed to collect, store, investigate, and report security 
incidents. As organisations are different and have different evidence-collection needs, the 
methodology that is selected should be a best fit for that particular organisation.   
Legal involvement 
The legal resources of an organisation must be consulted to ensure that their requirements on 
the subject of legislation, compliance, and limitations to collecting and storing 
comprehensive digital evidence are considered (Jordaan, 2009). The legal resources must be 
consulted for matters concerning policies, procedures, documentation, and reports 
(Rowlingson, 2004).  
Legal advisors must be trained and experienced in cyber laws and admissibility of such 
evidence, especially since such evidence might span several jurisdictions, for example, from 
South Africa to the UK (Rowlingson, 2004; Whyte & Claims, 2012). 
Systems and events 
The purpose of this domain is to identify all the source systems (hardware, software, 
technologies, people, policies, and procedures) that might house potential evidence, so that 
they may be included in the DFR strategy (Danielsson & Tjostheim, 2004). It also ensures 
that business events and processes that necessitate digital evidence are identified. This is 
essentially a risk assessment that is conducted at business level (Rowlingson, 2004). Below 
are a few examples of systems and technologies that might house potential evidence: 
 Phone logs 
 Firewalls 
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 Monitoring software 
 Routers  
 CCTV cameras 
 Computers 
Training 
Personnel and stakeholders must be suitably trained to handle potential evidence (Jordaan, 
2009; Valjarevic & Venter, 2011). Staff (especially those responding to incidents) that are not 
properly trained can negatively affect the results of a forensic investigation as there is a risk 
of them polluting the evidence (Rowlingson, 2004). Listed below are a few examples of 
groups that must undergo training: 
 Systems administrators 
 Human resource departments 
 Legal advisors 
 IT managers  
 Investigating teams 
 Process owners 
Monitor and report 
Sources that house potential evidence must be monitored to detect threats. Intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) are configured to report events when predefined threats are triggered and 
content checkers are triggered by certain keywords (Rowlingson, 2004). The suspicious event 
must be investigated and a decision must be made when and how to deal with the incident. 
The purpose of this step is to understand which IDS must be acquired, how they need to 
function, how triggers must respond, in what format a response should be, when to escalate to 
the next level, reporting criteria, and the standardisation of interaction between concerned 
parties (Danielsson & Tjostheim, 2004). 
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Policy and compliance 
This step ensures that evidence collection, storage, and handling policies and guidelines are 
in place. This step also allows producing a policy guideline on how a comprehensive 
evidence-based case must be built. Law and regulatory compliance is sought and 
incorporated in the security and IT policies. Some incidents are reportable under a 
compliance regime (Danielsson & Tjostheim, 2004): 
 Employees and stakeholders should be aware of the policies and procedures. 
 Compliance to these policies must be advocated.  
 The consequences for non-compliance must also be well documented. 
 Policies must be reviewed as must their review frequencies. 
Digital Forensics Management Framework (DFMF)   
A management framework for digital forensics was proposed by Grobler et al. (2010a). Their 
framework for proactive forensics is shown in Figure 2. As mentioned earlier, proactive 
forensics is a synonym for digital forensics.  
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Figure 2: DFMF and its elements (Source: Grobler et al., 2010a). 
Legal and judicial 
This domain deals with compliance and responds to the question “why”? The origin or 
purpose of this question is not clear but one can assume it relates to and answers the question: 
“Why is DFR required?” This domain refers to the judicial, regulatory, and legal 
requirements that will enable the implementation of DF in the organisation. The judicial 
requirements for countries might be different; for this reason, the requirements must be 
determined (Casey, 2004). For instance, does the HMG Security Policy Framework (SPF) 
principle apply for the processes of securing information? If the company operates within the 
UK’s government domain, then it does. 
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Grobler et al. (2010a) implied that the implementation of this step can foster the 
understanding of (a) court requirements, (b) regulatory requirements, (c) organisational 
culture, and (d) bylaws. 
Governance 
This domain also deals with the question “why?” It takes into account corporate governance 
as well as strategic, tactical, and operational management requirements. This deals with risk 
management in the organisation and also with the management of stakeholders and facilities. 
Companies must prepare a DF strategy with objectives and it must be included in the 
organisational structure (Grobler et al., 2010a; Grobler et al., 2010b).  
In the article by Grobler et al. (2010a), they maintain that possible outcomes from 
implementing this step would be the following:  
 A DF strategy with strategic goals,  
 An evidence control plan,  
 An assessment of governance controls, and  
 A framework to estimate costs of incidents. 
Policy 
The questions “what?”, “when?” and “who?” can be answered within this domain. 
Organisations must own a DF policy framework in which resides a general DF policy with 
auxiliary sub-policies (Grobler et al., 2010a; Grobler et al., 2010b). The general policy should 
provide an overview of the application and strategic intent. The sub-policies should provide 
detailed information evidence management and should include things such as evidence 
handling, evidence storing, and so forth. 
In their article, Grobler et al. (2010a) imply that possible outcomes from implementing 
this step can be the formation of  
 A DF policy framework, and  
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 Sub-policies within the general DF policy. 
Process 
The process domain supports the policy domain that provides guidance on 
implementation of policies and procedure. Procedures and processes must be forensically 
sound, as defined by Louwrens et al. (2006, p. 680) “processes that maintain the integrity of 
evidence, ensuring that the chain of custody remains unbroken and that collected evidence 
will be admissible in a court of law”. 
Grobler et al. (2010a) claimed that possible outcomes from implementing this step can 
be the development of  
 process guidelines,  
 procedures, and  
 processes that will support the Policy domain. 
Technology 
No organisation can do proper incidence investigation without DF tools and techniques; thus, 
this element addresses technologies and applications to use (Grobler et al., 2010a). Various 
DF tools can be used in different situations, for example, key-stroke loggers, write blockers, 
and EnCase—which is investigative software. A DF investigation laboratory is also advised 
(Grobler et al., 2010a).  
In their article, Grobler et al. (2010a) observed that possible outcomes from 
implementing this step can be  
 A well-equipped laboratory that houses DF tools and technologies; 
 A network infrastructure to support the DF strategy. 
People 
A DF training strategy and awareness programmes must be in place and should concentrate 
on the needs of different users. The findings of this study indicate that a possible outcome 
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from implementing this step can be the development of a training and awareness strategy 
with accredited training programmes. 
Comparison of DFRCF and DFMF:   
The two frameworks extend one another and are largely similar apart from the obvious 
difference in terms of graphical presentation. The DFMF is displayed as a flat, layered box, 
which makes the underlying sub-domains visible. This ensures transparency and provides 
information at a glance. The DFRCF is displayed as a cycling wheel with the Legal domain 
as the axis—similar to a continuous process improvement model based on the Deming cycle. 
The cycling wheel indicates the continuous progress towards optimal forensic readiness. 
The key difference between the two frameworks is their focal points. The DFMF is 
aimed at managing existing DFR, whereas the DFRCF is a framework for implementation of 
DFR.  
Obvious similarities 
The obvious similarities of the two frameworks are illustrated in Table 3 below. The table 
highlights the naming convention that used in the two frameworks.  
Table 3 
Obvious Similarities of the Two Frameworks   
Legal element 
Element Name Framework 
Legal involvement DFRCF 
Legal & Judicial DFMF 
(Source: Author) 
The above table suggests that this study must consider the legal, judicial, and legislative 
requirements of the country(ies) within which the organisation does business. Expert legal 
advice must be sought to elicit and understand the requirements (Casey, 2004).  
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Obscured similarities 
The concept of the People domain in the DFMF is misleading, because although the implied 
focus is on people, it goes on to discuss the training needs and the importance of accredited 
training and awareness programmes. The DFRCF named this domain the Training domain 
because, after all, the intended maturity model will assess the availability and penetration of 
training and awareness programmes. Both the frameworks have a Policy domain; however, 
the DFRCF has combined the Policy domain with the Compliance domain. Both of these 
domains are (a) major elements within DFR, and (b) address separate topics (Compliance 
advocates conformity to legislation and the Policy domain highlights the required 
documentation to be developed for DFR). It is clear from the above that the two domains 
warrant being discussed and presented as separate and different concepts and not as a single 
concept, as done by the DFRCF. In this study, the Policy domain is presented independently 
from the Compliance domain for the above reasons. 
The Systems and Events domain of the DFRCF is similar to the Technology and the 
Process elements of the DFMF. The DFRC framework combined the technology and process 
aspects of DFR within their System and Events domain because an information system can 
includes facets such as technologies, applications, hardware, manual inputs, and processes. 
Rowlingson (2004) further suggested that the identification and classification of 
hardware, software, processes, and events (that house potential digital evidence) should be 
performed as part of an activity within the Systems and Events domain. I, the researcher in 
this study, found it appropriate to retain the Systems and Events domain, as suggested by the 
DFRCF. Although Information systems and Events would be a better description for this 
domain, this study chose the shortened version, that is, Systems and Events, to keep the 
domain names succinct. 
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The DFRCF created a separate Methodology element that is tasked with investigating 
the evidence-collection needs of an organisation. The expected outcome of this element is an 
evidence-collection methodology and techniques for evidence management. The DFMF 
included the evidence-collection methodology and techniques in the Strategy element. This is 
practical, and it makes sense to do so, as the establishment of a methodology is also a 
strategic mandate. The DFRCF should consider including the methodology within the 
Strategy.   
Disparities 
The DFMF and the DFRCF applied different approaches to the Governance domain. The 
DFMF created the Governance element based on the goal of “proving (assessing) the 
effectiveness of controls, measured against IT and information security objectives” (Grobler 
et al., 2010a, p. 682). This implies that compliance and governance is used synonymously or 
that governance is an umbrella term that includes compliance. 
This study recognised the need to separate governance from compliance, because 
governance is considered to be the mechanisms, capabilities, and decision structures that 
must be put in place to ensure compliance to procedures, policies, and legislations within an 
organisation (Bonazzi, Hussami & Pigneur, 2010; Brown et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
compliance is considered to be the act of adhering or the act of demonstrating conformance to 
procedures, policies, and legislations within an organisation (Bonanzzi et al., 2010).  
The term compliance is more appropriate for the action of: “proving (assessing) the 
effectiveness of controls, measured against IT and information security objectives” (Grobler 
et al., 2010a, p.682). It means that DFMF can consider separating Governance from 
Compliance and creating two separate major domains that each focuses on the different 
aspects mentioned.   
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Although the Strategy and Compliance domains of the DFRCF and the Governance 
domain of the DFMF look similar, their focus differs: the focus of DFRCF is the compliance 
of policies, guidelines, objectives, and systems to DFR, whereas the DFMF focuses on the 
governance (and compliance) of policies, procedures, technology, and people.  
Consequently, the DFRCF should be extended to include a Governance domain as 
described by the DFMF. On the other hand, the DFMF could consider separating compliance 
from governance as these two aspects have different focuses.  
The designer of a framework has to consider the monitoring of systems or sources that 
house potential evidence, to detect threats (Valjarevic & Venter, 2011). The purpose of the 
Monitoring and Reporting domain is to identify the system’s requirements and their function, 
event triggers and their response requirements, response formats, and the reporting criteria 
(Danielsson  & Tjostheim, 2004).  At this stage, the organisation would also want to specify 
when the event can be escalated and what the protocol for interaction between concerned 
parties must be (Jordaan, 2009; Rowlingson, 2004). 
Of the two frameworks examined, only the DFRCF considers the above requirement. 
The DFMF should consider incorporating a domain that focuses on the monitoring of source 
systems that enable an organisation to understand its system acquisition needs, how triggers 
should be managed, what form the event responses should take, and what the reporting 
criteria should be. 
Summary of the Main Findings of the Comparative Analysis  
Table 4 below provides a summarised view of the findings that emerged from the 
comparative analysis of the DFMF and the DFRCF. The table provides a quick view of the 
DFR aspects that can be changed to augment the two frameworks. The detailed discussion 
illustrating how the DFRCF is extended is done in Chapter 3 of this study.  
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Table 4 
Findings of the Comparative Analysis  
DFMF DFRCF 
Model is graphically presented as a flat 
layered box, with visible sub-domains 
Model is graphically displayed as cycling 
wheel with the Legal domain as the axis 
Is focused towards managing existing DFR  Is focused on the implementation of DFR 
Can consider separating Governance from 
Compliance 
Can consider separating Policy from 
Compliance  
The domain titled: “People” is misleading 
and can be properly renamed to “Training” 
Can consider elaborating and describing in 
fuller details the activities concerned with 
processes within the Policy domain  
Can consider including a domain that focuses 
on the monitoring source systems 
Can consider making the methodology aspect 
and the development of an organisation 
structure part of the Strategy domain 
 
The following sections of this chapter focus on the objectives and design principles of a 
maturity assessment model. It then concludes by exploring modelling approaches and 
proposing a DFR maturity matrix. 
Principles and Objectives of a Maturity Model 
An assessment can be defined as the procedure of evaluating an entity against a model for 
continuous improvement so that the entity can realise what has been accomplished and what 
needs to be improved (Hillman, 1994). Hillman further reiterated the importance of selecting 
a suitable framework that is widely adopted to ensure comparisons against peers. The lack of 
existing DFR maturity models make this objective impossible to achieve.  
The following are some of the objectives and goals of maturity assessment models: 
 To discover areas needing improvement and to act on them and to maintain what 
has been performed well. 
 To help in directing organisations in the designing of processes that lead to a 
“state of maturity in the area for which the model was developed” (White, 2007, 
p. 2). 
 To assess the maturity of the procedure and to assign a maturity level. 
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 To match up to the maturity of the organisation’s process against other 
organisations and against best-practices. 
 To present a method of learning to enhance the maturity level (Randeree, Mahal, 
& Narwani, 2012). 
Maturity Models to Assess DFR 
As mentioned earlier in the study, organisations integrate DFR in the information security 
domain and also assess it as part of the information security domain. The problem with this 
approach is that information security neglects the magnitude of developing procedures and 
controls that will have successful investigation outcomes (Pangalos et al., 2010: p. 16). This 
means that the assessment of DFR as part of information security is discouraged because this 
approach will lead to a failure to satisfy the DFR objective that seeks to “demonstrate good 
governance by assessing the effectiveness of controls”.   
Moreover, forensics is applied to less than 30% of business security incidents (Pangalos 
et al., 2010). This implies that the DFR assessments that are performed as part of the 
information security are potentially based on a small percentage of security incidents. Such 
an assessment will present a dubious view of the state of DFR.  
An added complexity is the disparate focal points of Information security and DFR. 
Information security focuses on the availability, reliability, and confidentiality of 
information, whereas digital forensic readiness is concerned with the identification, 
preservation, analyses, and presentation of information (Pangalos & Katos, 2010). It is thus 
conceivable that an information security assessment will not have a DFR focus.   
Furthermore, traditional security models struggle with the alignment of IT security and 
the strategic business objectives (Grandison, Bilger, O’Connor, Graf, Swimmer, Schunter, 
Wespi, & Zunic, 2007). DFR requires an alignment between the business and legal 
requirements as well as the IT strategy, as is evident in the Strategy domain of the DFRC 
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framework. Thus, it would not be advisable to apply a model that disregards the need to align 
IT with business objectives. 
As mentioned earlier in this study; preliminary interviews with forensic practitioners and 
organisations that are concerned with DFR highlight the fact that their practices only assess 
DFR as part of information security. Thus, it seems as if this approach is considered a best 
practice, at least for the four reputed organisations consulted. In the course of this study, no 
alternative approaches
4
 (academic or non-proprietary) to assess DFR were encountered.  
Therefore, because of the (a) above-mentioned shortcomings in the approach to using 
information security assessment to assess DFR and (b) due to a lack of existing DFR maturity 
models, this study will develop a DFR maturity assessment model (DFRMAM) based on the 
structure of the extended DFRC framework. In addition to the structure of the extended 
DFRCF, this study will also exploit the maturity matrix that is suggested within the data-
centric security model (DCSM) by incorporating it into the proposed DFRMAM. 
The use of the DCSM was selected for this study because, like the DFRCF, (a) it is 
informed by the objectives of the business strategy and requirements, (b) it aligns IT security 
with business strategy, and (c) the model was designed by IBM, one of the most respected 
and innovative companies (Business Week, 2009).  
The Data Centric Security Model (DCSM) 
This model was designed by IBM to assist organisations to align their IT capability with their 
business goals (Van Cleeff, 2008). The model achieves this by directly connecting security 
activities to the data it protects (Grandison et al., 2007).   
The model has two main components (domains), namely the policy and the data pillars 
(see Figure 3 below).  
                                                 
4
 Note: this researcher did discover one alternative approach, but only during the data 
collection stage, not prior to the data collection stage. 
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Figure 3: Data centric security model (Source: Van Cleeff, 2008, p. 113). 
An overview of the pillars, and the maturity matrix of the DCSM, follows next. The 
ensuing discussion on the pillars and maturity matrix are brief because it is not the intention 
in this study to utilise the pillars or their content. Only the naming convention of the maturity 
levels of the DCSM will be used by this study. The detail (description) of the maturity levels 
will be extracted from forensic practitioners during the data gathering phase of the study.  
 
Policy pillar 
The following is a summary of the activities presented within the policy pillar:  
 The organisation will gather all the business and legal requirements and resolve all 
conflicts and document a set of cohesive requirements. 
 The business and legal requirements are fed into a description for data security 
policies and procedures. 
 Data attributes and labels are used to determine the data classes. Data are also 
classified by ownership, origin, time, and location, and data governance is an outcome 
of this step. 
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 The policy classification and governance are encoded into a set of data control rules. 
The rules determine practices for handling and accessing data. 
Data pillar  
The following is a summary of the activities presented within the data pillar:  
 Access to data and permissible actions are controlled by a data control layer, as 
indicated by the data control rules. 
 There are different layers of protection and access through roles, business 
applications, and infrastructure. 
Maturity matrix of the DCSM  
Table 5 below illustrates the maturity matrix of the DCSM. The maturity matrix consists 
of the components (sub-domains) and the adoption levels (maturity levels). What follows is a 
discussion on the components and the maturity levels. 
Table 5 
The Maturity Matrix Of The DCSM  
Components Adoption levels 
Basic Intermediate Advanced Full 
Security 
Infrastructure 
    
Business Data 
classification 
    
Role Definitions     
Policies by 
classification 
    
Data is labelled     
Data Flow 
Analysis 
    
Automated 
policy 
provisioning 
    
(Source: Van Cleeff, 2008, p. 114) 
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Maturity components (sub-domains) 
The following are the components (sub-domains) of the policy and the data pillars (domains). 
 Security infrastructure:  
This is the first phase of the initial execution of the policy pillar, which is responsible 
for the identification of data types and business and legal requirements of the 
organisation.  
 Business data classification:  
Data attributes and labels are used to determine the data classes. Data is also classified 
by ownership, origin, time, and location, and data governance is an outcome of this 
step. 
 Roles definitions:  
A the top of the data pillar is a role-based authentication component that identifies 
users and assigns roles to the users based on authentication policies provided by the 
policy pillar. 
 Policies by classification:  
Policy designs are federated between multiple authorities inside an enterprise. 
 Data is labelled:  
This is the enabling of runtime labelling of channels and data while enabling 
automated policy selection. 
 Data flow analysis:  
Data and communication channels are labelled at runtime. 
 Automated policy provisioning:  
Systems normally have multiple policies based on the classification of the data. The 
policies are designed separately and then provisioned for the different system types. 
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Adoption levels (maturity levels) 
The DCS model has four adoption (maturity) levels, namely Level 1: Basic, Level 2: 
Intermediate, Level 3: Advanced, and Level 4: Full (Grandison et al., 2007; Van Cleeff, 
2008). Each of the levels is discussed below: 
 Level 1: Basic 
This model suggests that most organisations exhibit this level of maturity because, at 
this stage, the organisation would have defined the information security requirements 
needed to protect critical information assets. This, however, may lead to 
overprotection of non-critical information assets. Simply put, this can be related to the 
DFR as at this level, an organisation needs to have a basic understanding of the 
forensic needs. However, this study will only utilise the naming convention, namely, 
Level 1: Basic. This implies that the basics of DFR are observed by organisations. 
 Level 2: Intermediate 
This level will be reached when organisations have agreed on data classifications, 
have agreed on the protection required per classification, and security is implemented 
considering the most critical information assets. This is also where the organisation 
must demonstrate that it has policies that are designed for each system. DFRMAM 
can relate to this final step since the model has to assess whether the various forensic 
policies have been implemented within the organisation. 
 Level 3: Advanced 
This level of maturity implies that an organisation has systems that can, amongst 
others, use an assortment of access control rules for the varied type of data it interacts 
with. There is no clear understanding how the description of this maturity level can be 
used by the DFRMAM; however, as mentioned earlier; this DFRMAM will only 
utilise the name of the maturity level. 
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 Level 4: Full 
For organisations to reach this level, they would have had to achieve all the previous 
ratings, as listed by the preceding maturity levels.  In addition to this, the organisation 
would have systems that perform automated security policy management. However, it 
appears as if the authors Grandison et al.( 2007) have not successfully managed to 
distinguish between Level 4 and Level 5, as it is unclear what the differentiating 
factor is. There is no clear understanding of how the description of this maturity level 
can be used by the DFRMAM. 
Design Principles to Consider When Developing a Model 
This section discusses the principles that must be observed throughout the development 
lifecycle of a maturity model and identify the model contents that need further clarification 
through data collection.   
Authors of literature on this topic have already dealt with the aspects of design principles 
(De Bruin, Freeze, Kaulkarni, & Rosemann, 2005; Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2009; 
Becker, Knackstedt, & Pöppelbuß, 2009; Solli-Sæther & Gottschalk, 2010; Pöppelbuß & 
Röglinger, 2011; Röglinger, Pöppelbuß, & Becker, 2012). For this study, the design 
structures as proposed by two studies are employed, namely those of  
 De Bruin et al. (2005), because this study is cited in several articles and thus became 
popular, and  
 Pöppelbuß et al. (2011), because their study encapsulates different design principles 
to propose a practical checklist for researchers involved in the design of maturity 
models. 
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A maturity model development framework  
According to De Bruin et al. (2005), a maturity model must have a development framework 
that considers the purpose for which the framework is designed. The maturity assessment 
design may be descriptive, prescriptive, or comparative.  
 A descriptive model is defined as a single-point event that does not plot a path 
towards improving maturity or it is a model that does not present relationships to 
performance. This model is good for assessing the current standing of an event and it 
is used as a diagnostic tool (Maier et al., 2009; Pöppelbuß et al., 2011).  
 A prescriptive model focuses on the emphasis of domain relationships in relation to 
business performance. It also plots a path to maturity. 
 The comparative model allows the comparison of similar practices across industries.  
It is, however, more feasible that the above models are an evolution of each other as a 
model can, at first, be descriptive, as it understands its immediate environment. Then it grows 
into the prescriptive state as it repeatedly achieves deeper understanding until it can be 
applied across industries.  
In addition to the abovementioned three types of models, Pöppelbuß et al. (2011) 
postulated an additional model; the basic model. They suggested that this model is so 
rudimentary that its only purpose is to illustrate the minimum aspects of a model.  
There is thus an evolutionary aspect in the “coming of age” of a maturity model—as 
depicted in Figure 4. This implies that the descriptive model must comply with the basic 
model’s design principle and the prescriptive model must comply with the descriptive 
model’s design principle, and so on. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of maturity model (Source: Pöppelbuß et al., 2011). 
This study will adopt a prescriptive model design approach to baseline a model for 
further research and input. The natural evolution to a comparative model should happen after 
the model has been tested and applied and changes have been incorporated into the model. A 
second iteration would thus be required. This falls outside the scope of this study.  
Development framework and its phases 
Figure 6 below illustrates the different phases within the standard model development 
framework. The model can be applied across disciplines. Models such as the business process 
maturity models and knowledge management capability assessment were developed using the 
standard development model framework (De Bruin et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 5: Model development framework (Source: De Brui, et al., 2005, p. 3) 
Van Steenbergen, Bos, Brinkkemper, Van de Weerd, and Bekkers (2010) proposed a 
similar methodology for developing focus-area maturity models, as depicted in Figure 6 
below. 
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Figure 6: Focus area maturity models (Source: Steenbergen et al., 2010). 
The focus-area maturity model has four phases, namely, scoping, design model, 
instrument development, and finally, the implementation and exploitation phase. 
Unfortunately, the model and discussions of the article do not articulate the notations within 
the phases. As mentioned, the models are mostly similar, with differences primarily in the 
naming of phases and the number of phases. Key differences between the models are as 
follow: 
 The model development framework does not consider dependencies between 
elements or sub-elements. This is important to highlight so that it becomes 
transparent when plotting a performance plan.  
 The model development framework does not have a communication plan, 
especially one that is as formal as the focus area maturity models. Although 
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this is implied within the maintenance phase, it is worthy of a mention so that 
it becomes part of the maintenance plan. 
 The focus-area maturity model does not have a test phase. It is important to 
test the contents and design with a pilot study and bring about changes 
iteratively to achieve wide acceptance and adoption.  
1. Scoping phase 
This is the first phase of the development and it sets the boundaries for application 
and its use. The major decisions to be made are illustrated by Table 6 below. The 
checkmarks indicate the decisions applicable to this study. 
Table 6 
Decision Points for Maturity Model  
Criterion Characteristics 
Focus of Model Domain specific √ General 
Prerequisites for 
applicability 
(Pöppelbuß et al., 
2011) 
Good understanding of digital forensic readiness. 
Purpose of use 
(Pöppelbuß et al., 
2011) 
To assist organisations to gauge their level of maturity 
towards forensic readiness and thereby to provide a tool to 
examine the gap to a state of full maturity. 
Model 
differentiation  
(Pöppelbuß et al., 
2011) 
There are no existing DFR models to differentiate against. 
This model is aimed at DFR—no other models have this 
focus. 
Development 
stakeholders 
Academia  Practitioners 
√ 
Government  Combination 
(Source: De Bruin, et al. 2005) 
The focus of the model will be particular to digital forensic readiness, and it is aimed at 
practitioners with a good understanding of DFR. This focus distinguishes it from other 
models. Pöppelbuß et al. (2011) advocated the inclusion of pre-requisites, purpose, and 
differentiation as part of the aspects of designing a model and will thus be included in this 
model.  
   
 
 
 
 
Ivan Claims        Page 38 of 142 
2. Designing phase 
a. Design metrics 
The second phase’s objective is to establish an architecture or design of the 
model. Table 7 below indicates the major decisions to be made in this phase. The 
checkmarks show the decisions applicable to this study. 
Table 7 
Decision When Designing a Maturity Model  
Criterion Characteristics 
Audience 
Internal √ External √ 
Executives, Management √ 
Auditors, Practitioners, 
academics √ 
Method of 
application 
Driver of 
application 
Self-assessment √ 
Third Party 
Assisted√ 
Certified Practitioner  
Internal 
requirement  
External 
requirement  
Both √ 
Respondents Management √ Staff √ Business Partners 
Application 
1 entity/ region √ 
Multiple 
entities/single 
region√ 
Multiple 
entities/multiple 
regions √ 
(Source: De Bruin, et al. 2005) 
 
The model is primarily aimed for internal use by executives and management, but 
it is envisaged that external academics (such as the author of this study) will play 
an initial role in the assessment of an organisation. There will be an initial 
external drive from academics to have the model evaluated and tested. 
Organisations will be able to do self-assessment and or consult academics to 
perform assessments. The initial drive will be external. 
This will, it is hoped, change as more entities become aware of the model 
and its uses. The participants will be the management team and staff in critical 
forensic roles. This mode is aimed at organisations that will mostly be operating 
in a single region with a single entity. However, in this study, the model with 
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organisations that have multiple entities and multiple regions to examine the 
extensibility of the model will also be tested.  
b. Maturity levels 
This phase determines the maturity levels and descriptions. A top-down or 
bottom-up approach is usually employed to establish the levels of maturity. 
Definitions of the maturity levels are first developed before measures are defined 
to fit the definitions—in a top-down approach. The bottom-up approach 
encourages the development of measures first and the retrofit of definitions to fit 
the measures (De Bruin et al., 2005).  
Table 8 below identifies the major decisions to be made in the phase and the checkmarks 
indicate what decisions were made for this study. 
Table 8 
Proposed Maturity Levels and Definitions  
Criterion Characteristics 
Approach 
Top-down √ Bottom-up  
Maturity levels 
Level 1: Non-
existent 
To be defined 
Level 2: Basic To be defined 
Level 3: 
Intermediate 
To be defined 
Level 4: Advanced To be defined 
Level 5: Full To be defined 
(Source: Author) 
A top-down approach is envisaged, and the proposed levels are Level 1: Non-
existent, Level 2: Basic, Level 3: Intermediate, Level 4: Advanced, Level 5 Full. 
The above levels are an adaptation of the levels suggested by the DCSM. The 
DCSM has four levels, but the DFRMAM will have five levels of maturity. The 
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reason for this is that the DCSM implies that every organisation will already have 
a basic level of information security. 
However, for this study, the need to add a level preceding the basic level was 
recognised; this is to accommodate organisations that have not fulfilled all the 
activities within the basic level. This new level will be named Level 1: Non-
Existent. This will be the first level of maturity towards the path of full maturity 
(level 5).  
The levels indicate compliance towards full DFR. For example, an 
assessment at Level 2 means that the entity is aware of DFR but has only fulfilled 
the basic requirements towards DFR maturity. Although this study proposes the 
definitions of the maturity levels; they will be validated with forensic 
practitioners during the data collection phase of this study. This is consistent with 
a top-down design approach. 
c. Domains (or elements) and sub-domains of the model.  
Table 9 below indicates the proposed major domains and sub-domains of the 
maturity assessment model. The maturity levels are adapted from the IBM’s data-
centric security model matrix.  
Table 9 
Proposed DFRMAM Domains  
DFRMAM Domains 
DFR Strategy 
Legal requirements 
Governance 
Systems & Events 
Policy 
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Compliance 
Training 
Monitor & Report 
 
d. Dependencies between domains and sub-domains.  
As proposed by the focus area maturity model, the dependencies between 
domains and sub-domains must be identified and clarified to ensure that a 
performance plan that addresses the dependencies is designed (Steenbergen et al., 
2010). This dependency has already been illustrated in Chapter 2. 
3. Populate phase 
This phase is the identification of what needs to be measured and how this will be 
measured. The elements within DFR are reasonably identifiable from the related 
literature. However, because DFR is a relatively new field and existing literature does 
not provide the assessment matrix, the researched literature provides theoretical 
models that have not necessarily been tested in the real world. The development of 
sub-elements requires collaboration with practitioners and fellow academics, and this 
will be resolved in the data collection phase of this study. 
Literature promotes the use of sub-elements to extract facets that add deeper 
understanding, without which it will be difficult to plot improvement strategies 
towards maturity (De Bruin et al., 2005). The sub-elements assist in the development 
of questions that must be answered to fulfil a maturity requirement. The use of Delphi 
techniques, case studies, focus groups, and nominal techniques is recommended to 
extract this information (De Bruin et al., 2005).  
 
4. Test phase 
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De Bruin et al. (2005) proposed that a maturity model’s construction, including 
content and instruments, must be tested for reliability, validity, and generalisability. 
This study will have the opportunity to do so during the data collection phase. The 
model will be discussed with various forensic practitioners who will validate the 
model by providing their input and criticism. Verifying/validating the DFRMAM will 
attest to its significance and relevance in the DFR domain (Soni & Kodali, 2013, p, 
275).  
5. Deployment phase 
The intention of this phase is to make the model available to its stakeholders and 
intended audience. Authors of the literature reviewed have suggested deploying the 
model within the entities that assisted with the development of the model and later to 
other regions that were not involved with the development of the model. This study’s 
primary focus is the deployment of the model to fellow academics through published 
articles and so forth. 
6. Maintain phase 
The goal, scope, and acceptability of the model determine the resources that are 
responsible to maintain the model. A repository will be necessary as the model 
evolves from prescriptive to comparative. The model must have resources to maintain 
it as its continuant relevance is determined by its maintenance over time. The 
repository is envisaged to be this research paper, and the resources to provide upkeep 
of the model will be the academics that will do further research on this model or the 
practitioners who will utilise the model within their practices.  
The author of this study hopes that fellow academics, researchers and practitioners will see 
the value of the model and in doing so take responsibility for the development of the model 
over time.  
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Chapter Summary  
As the reviewed literature showed, there are no existing DFR maturity assessment models; 
this study was conducted to undertake the development of such a model. However, to develop 
such an assessment model, the structure (domains and sub-domains) of DFR had to be 
identified. During the course of the research, several frameworks that illustrate the structure 
of DFR were identified, and thus, the first part of the research question was resolved by this 
study, namely: “What DFR structure (elements or domains) is needed by financial services 
businesses? Five of the six frameworks employed a qualitative approach to understand the 
forensic landscape.  
Furthermore, a comparative analysis between the DFRC and the DFM frameworks was 
performed and the findings contributed to (a) the extension of the DFRC framework and (b) 
the goals and objectives of DFR. Thus, the research sub-questions 1 and 2 were answered by 
this study. 
Moreover, it became apparent that no existing DFRMAM can be utilised for this type of 
study so a maturity assessment model with a maturity matrix was designed, based on the 
development framework as postulated by De Bruin et al. and Pöppelbuß et al. (De Bruin et 
al., 2005; Pöppelbuß et al., 2011). This design proposes a qualitative approach to developing 
and implementing the maturity assessment model. The research sub-questions 3 and 4 were 
therefore answered by this study. 
Table10 below illustrates the design principles and content of the model. The content in 
the table will be evaluated with practitioners.  
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Table 10 
Design Principles to be Tested with Practitioners 
Criterion Characteristics 
Focus of Model Domain specific √ General 
Prerequisites for 
applicability 
(Pöppelbuß et al., 
2011) 
Good understanding of digital forensic readiness. 
Purpose of use 
(Pöppelbuß et al., 
2011) 
To assist organisations to gauge their level of maturity 
towards forensic readiness and thereby to provide a tool to 
examine the gap to a state of full maturity. 
Model differentiation 
(Pöppelbuß et al., 
2011) 
There are no existing DFR models to differentiate against. 
This model is aimed at DFR—no other models have this 
focus. 
Development 
stakeholders 
Academia  Practitioners 
√ 
Government  Combination 
Audience 
Internal √ External √ 
Executives, Management 
√ 
Auditors, Practitioners, 
academics √ 
Method of application 
 
 
Self-
assessment √ 
Third Party 
Assisted√ 
Certified Practitioner  
Driver of application Internal 
requirement  
External 
requirement  
Both √ 
Respondents Management 
√ 
Staff √ Business Partners 
Application 
1 entity/1 
region √ 
Multiple 
entities/single 
region 
Multiple 
entities/multiple regions 
√ 
Approach Top-down √ Bottom-up  
Maturity levels 
Level 1: Non-existent To be defined 
Level 2: Basic To be defined 
Level 3: Intermediate To be defined 
Level 4: Advanced To be defined 
Level 5: Full To be defined 
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Table 11 below depicts the proposed major domains, sub domains, and maturity levels of 
the DFR maturity assessment model.  
Table 11 
Proposed Maturity Domains and Levels  
Domains  Maturity levels 
Non- existent Basic Intermediate Advanced Full 
DFR strategy      
Legal requirements      
Governance      
Systems & Events      
Policy      
Compliance      
Training      
Monitor  & report      
In the following chapter, the extended framework will be discussed in detail and the new 
graphical presentation of the DFRCF illustrated. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXTENDED DFRC FRAMEWORK 
This chapter provides elaboration on the extended digital forensic readiness framework by a 
discussion of the domains and their outputs. It also illustrates which goals and objectives are 
satisfied by the domains and illustrates which domains and sub-domains should be used to 
compile a maturity matrix.  
Extended DFRC Framework  
In Figure 7, there is a graphical depiction of the extended DFRCF—before forensic expert 
input. It depicts the major domains (for example, strategy) and expected outputs for 
(example, organisation structure). The outputs will be referred to as sub-domains in this 
study; this is to ensure that consistency is observed within the study and also because the 
framework that is being extended does not refer to outputs.  
The graphical depiction of the DFRC framework was changed to represent a flat layer so 
that the sub-domains are easily visible. The extra visibility facilitates easier conversations 
during the data gathering phase of the study. This framework would enable organisations, 
particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs), to understand the scale and scope of 
implementing a DFR programme. 
The extended DFRCF also illustrates the major domains and their respective sub-
domains that must be assessed (measured) by the DFR maturity model. This is the structure 
that will be used to compile a DFR maturity assessment model.   
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Figure 7: Extended DFRCF-v1, with domains and sub-domains, pre participant input. 
The domains discussed hereafter incorporate the recommendations based on the 
comparative analysis that was done in Chapter 2 of this study. 
Strategy 
The rationale behind this domain is to ensure that an organisation has (a) a DFR strategy 
aligned to the organisations goals, (b) a structure that highlights the reporting lines of the 
forensic unit, and (c) that it has constructed a technique to evaluate the evidence collection 
need.  
There must be a strategic mandate from executive management to implement and 
maintain digital forensic readiness (Grobler et al., 2010a). A strategy communicated from this 
 
 
 
 
 
Ivan Claims        Page 48 of 142 
level will ensure top management commitment and will promote the DFR framework 
downwards. It also ensures that resources and finances are allocated to facilitate DFR.  
The illustration of the reporting line of the forensic unit ensures that stakeholders are 
aware which unit is responsible for handling forensic incidents (Grobler et al., 2010a; Grobler 
et al., 2010b).  
It is also important for an organisation to identify their evidence-collection need; 
however, the use of the phrase evidence collection methodology rather than evidence-
collection need is proposed for this study. The reason for this is that this sub-domain activity 
should also consider things such as evidence-gathering requirements. The use of the phrase 
evidence collection methodology is more encompassing and thus more suitable.  
The implementation of this particular domain can assist with the realisation of a DF 
strategy and an evidence-collection statement to enable the alignment of business risk units 
with incident-monitoring units (Whyte & Claims, 2012). The finalisation of sub-domain 
activities in this domain can produce the following outputs: 
 Organisation structure depicting the forensic unit and responsibilities 
 DFR strategy that illustrates the objectives and goals 
 Evidence-collection methodology. 
Although this domain does not satisfy any of the goals and objectives as stipulated in 
Table1, it is an important part of DFR as it will ensure that DFR is driven from the senior 
management level down to ordinary staff. One could argue that a further purpose of this 
domain is to promote an enterprise-wide adoption of proactive digital forensics in an 
organisation. 
Governance 
This is a new domain within DFRCF and it advocates (a) the establishment of a DF policy 
frameworks and guidelines to ensure uniformity across the enterprise and (b) that governing 
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bodies
5
 should ensure that the policies and policy frameworks are implemented according to 
agreed standards (Grobler et al., 2010a).  
Also, there must be a framework to calculate the costs of an incident investigation. 
Calculating the cost before an investigation will provide an indication of how successful, or 
not, their governance controls are (Grobler et al., 2010a). 
The following are outputs that can be produced when completing the sub-domain 
activities within this domain: 
 An evidence management (control) plan,  
 An assessment of governance controls, and  
 A framework to estimate costs of incidents. 
This domain satisfies the following goals and objectives of DFR— as illustrated by Table12 
below: 
Table 12 
DFR Goals and Objectives met by the Governance Domain  
No Objectives and Goals of Digital Forensics Reference 
6 
To enhance the performance of IT & Info sec with DF 
tools in an organisation. 
Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
7 
To demonstrate good governance by assessing the 
effectiveness of controls. 
Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
Systems and Events: 
This domain ensures the identification and classification of hardware, software, processes, 
and events that house potential digital evidence. This is essentially a risk assessment that is 
conducted at business level (Rowlingson, 2004). The above activities will lead to systems and 
                                                 
5
 The governing bodies of an organisation are usually operational managers, strategic 
managers, and executive managers 
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infrastructure requirements as the organisation identifies the gaps that must be bridged to 
achieve its DFR objectives. New or improved technologies, hardware, software, and 
infrastructure might need to be acquired. 
The establishment of a laboratory equipped with technologies and DF tools to do proper 
investigations is crucial within the DF realm (Grobler et al., 2010). The laboratory must strive 
towards ISO17025 certification as this validates that a laboratory is proficient to construct 
technically valid data and results (Wilsdon & Slay, 2005). 
The following are all the possible outputs that can be produced when completing all the 
sub-domain activities within this domain: 
 The identification and classification of source systems 
 The identification of business events, 
 Risk assessment,  
 A list of systems and infrastructure requirements,  
 A plan to acquire laboratory competence and accreditation.  
This domain satisfies the following goals and objectives of DFR—as illustrated by Table13 
below: 
Table 13 
DFR Goals and Objectives met by the Systems and Events Domain  
No Objectives and goals of digital forensic Reference 
1 
To maximise an environment’s ability to harvest credible 
evidence. 
Tan, 2001; Grobler et 
al., 2010b 
2 
To maximise the potential to use comprehensive digital 
evidence. 
Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
3 
To minimise the cost of forensics during an incident 
response. 
Tan, 2001 
4 
To gather evidence targeting the potential crimes and 
disputes that may adversely affect an organisation. 
Rowlingson, 2004 
8 To create proper data for good investigation leads. Bradford et al., 2004 
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Policy 
As noted earlier, there is a need to separate the Policy domain from the Compliance domain. 
This domain ensures that underlying policies and procedures are implemented according to 
agreed standards, as identified within the Governance domain. The following are examples of 
DF policies that can be implemented within an organisation (Barske et al., 2011): 
 Policies about the acceptable use of information systems within the 
organisation.  
 Policies that illuminate that source systems and their data within are the sole 
property of an organisation. A user must provide assurance that any data 
engaged with within the organisation will be monitored. 
 Policies that inform the user how the source system will be monitored. 
 Policies that inform when potential digital evidence will be preserved as well 
as what records will be preserved. 
 Policies that indicate how long different types of digital evidence will be 
preserved and how they will be preserved and securely handled. 
 Policies that indicate the conditions that will initiate an internal investigation 
and what actions might be taken in such an event. 
 Policies that clarify the conditions under which digital evidence might be 
released to third parties such as law enforcement. 
 Policies that clearly illustrate the responsibility, accountability. and roles that 
are involved in managing potential digital evidence and performing digital 
forensic investigations. 
 Policies that clarify the legal review process in an event of a digital forensic 
incident investigation.  
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The above policies are possible outputs that can be produced when completing all the 
sub-domain activities within this domain. However, an organisation has to asses which 
policies are applicable and relevant to its entity. This domain satisfies the following goals and 
objectives of DFR— as illustrated in Table14, below: 
Table 14 
DFR Goals and Objectives met by the Policy Domain  
No Objectives and goals of digital forensic Reference 
5 To prevent anti-forensic activities. 
Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
9 
To gather admissible evidence legally and without 
interfering with business processes. 
Pangalos et al., 2010 
Compliance 
This domain was previously part of the Policy domain but has been separated because it is 
concerned with user conformance to legislation and DFR policies. A possible output that can 
be produced when completing all the activities within this domain is development of audit 
reports that measure conformance to governance requirements 
This domain satisfies the following goals and objectives of DFR— as illustrated by 
Table15 below: 
Table 15 
DFR Goals and Objectives met by the Compliance Domain  
No Objectives and goals of digital forensics Reference 
6 
To enhance the performance of IT & Info sec with DF 
tools in an organisation. 
Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
7 
To demonstrate good governance by assessing the 
effectiveness of controls. 
Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
Training 
This domain ensures that a DF training strategy is developed, DFR awareness campaigns are 
created, and that a DF training programme is developed. The training needs of the whole 
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organisation must be assessed and accreditation must be sought for key forensic staff 
(Grobler et al., 2010a; Grobler et al., 2010b). 
It is probably sufficient for the front desk operator to be aware of the forensic strategy 
and policies, but accreditation is crucial for the first responders as they will directly engage 
with the potential evidence, and the organisation would run the risk of evidence 
contamination if unskilled staff engages with evidence. 
Laboratory certification must also be part of the training objective (Wilsdon & Slay, 
2005). The ten-step process advocates role-play (DF incident simulation) training to ensure 
that all parties concerned are aware of decision-making points and actions (Rowlingson, 
2004). It is possible to run DF incident simulations in conjunction with disaster recovery 
exercises. 
The following are possible outputs that can be produced when completing the sub-
domain activities within this domain: 
 Awareness campaigns 
 A training strategy with accredited training programmes.  
This domain satisfies the following goals and objectives of DFR—as illustrated by Table16, 
below: 
Table 16 
DFR Goals and Objectives met by the Training Domain  
No Objectives and goals of digital forensic Reference 
11 
To minimise interruption to the business from any 
investigation. 
Pangalos, Ilioudis, & 
Pagkalos, 2010 
Monitor and Report 
This domain will ensure that organisations compile DF Incident report which comply with 
requirements (such as the report format, and so forth) and have an incident escalation policy. 
A cost analysis must be done before an investigation is commenced—to determine the 
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feasibility of such an investigation (Rowlingson, 2004). The following are possible outputs 
that can be produced when completing all the activities within this domain: 
 Reporting criteria (report format, report requirements, and so forth)  
 Incident escalation policy 
 Cost analysis  
 A needs analysis for monitoring tools 
 How IDS triggers should function and respond 
 Guidelines (standards) for interaction between concerned parties (Whyte & 
Claims, 2012).  
This domain satisfies the following goals and objectives of DFR—as illustrated in Table17 
below: 
Table 17 
DFR Goals and Objectives met by the Monitor and Report Domain  
No Objectives and goals of digital forensic Reference 
5 
To prevent cybercrime activities. Grobler et al., 2010a; 
Grobler et al., 2010b 
9 
To gather admissible evidence legally and without 
interfering with business processes. 
Pangalos et al., 2010 
10 
To allow an investigation to proceed at a cost in 
proportion to the incident. 
Pangalos et al., 2010 
11 
To minimise interruption to the business from any 
investigation. 
Pangalos et al, 2010 
Legal Requirements 
This domain was named the Legal involvement domain; however, this name will be changed 
to the Legal requirements domain as it provides a better description of the accompanying 
activities. This domain ensures that judicial, regulatory, and other laws within the 
organisation’s realm of operation are considered and incorporated in the overall DFR 
strategy. It must inform all outcomes within the framework (Rowlingson, 2004; Whyte & 
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Claims, 2012). The following are possible outputs that can be produced when completing all 
the activities within this domain: 
 Legal requirements  
 Judicial requirements  
 Other lawful requirements 
 Business requirements.  
This domain satisfies the following goals and objectives of DFR—as illustrated by Table18, 
below: 
Table 18 
DFR Goals and Objectives met by the Legal Requirements Domain  
No Objectives and goals of digital forensic Reference 
4 
To gather evidence targeting the potential crimes and 
disputes that may adversely impact an organisation. 
Rowlingson, 2004 
9 
To gather admissible evidence legally and without 
interfering with business processes. 
Pangalos Ilioudis, & 
Pagkalos, 2010 
12 
To ensure that evidence makes a positive impact on the 
outcome of any legal action. 
Pangalos, Ilioudis, & 
Pagkalos, 2010 
The extended DFRC framework-v1 incorporates the best of the DFRC and the DFM 
frameworks. This study married all the goals and objectives, as identified in Table1 of this 
study, to the extended DFRCF model. It is thus reasonable to declare that the DFRCF model, 
when managed to perform all the activities within the domains, will ensure that all the goals 
and objectives of DFR are met.  
Furthermore, the DFRCF provides an opportunity to contribute to the enhancement of 
the goals and objectives of DFR. The activities within the Strategy domain could not be 
reconciled to the existing goals and objectives and therefore this study includes the following 
goal in the list of goals and objectives: To promote an enterprise-wide adoption of proactive 
digital forensics. 
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The possible reasons why existing frameworks do not reconcile (align) with the goals 
and objectives of DFR could be because (a) no previous attempts had been made to reconcile 
the goals and objectives with the frameworks, and (b) it is possible that researchers do not 
understand the benefits of such an alignment.  
There are several frameworks, or at least interventions, that seek to align the one or other 
entity (or activity) with another entity (or activity). The overall alignment model is an 
example of a model that seeks to align information technology with business strategy 
(Henderson & Venkatraman, 1993). A similar model was presented by Luftman et al, and 
called the strategic alignment model (Luftman, Lewis, & Oldach, 1993). It is reasonable to 
conclude that the misalignment of entities that should be aligned has undesired effects on a 
business, hence, the resources used and the efforts made by organisations to align these 
activities, post implementation. It would therefore be preferable to develop a DFR framework 
that is aligned with the objectives and goals of DFR—such as the DFRCF. 
It is necessary for this study to verify/validate the DFRCF-v1 so that its significance and 
relevance can be attested in the DFR domain (Soni & Kodali, 2013, p. 275). A verified 
framework promotes frequent use and frequent use promotes generalisation (Soni & Kodali, 
2013, p. 275).  
Chapter Summary 
The extended DFRC framework harnesses the best of the DFRC and the DFM frameworks. 
The domains and sub-domains of the extended DFRCF form the structure of DFR and help to 
answer the first part of the research question that seeks to understand “What DFR structure 
(elements or domains) is needed by financial services businesses”.  
The extended framework not only illustrates which goals and objectives of DFR are 
realised, but it also contributes to the body of knowledge by adding a new objective, namely: 
to promote an enterprise-wide adoption of proactive digital forensics. 
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In the following chapter, the research design and methodology that was utilised in this 
study will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, the framework that was utilised to select the research methodology, the 
data collection technique, and the subsequent data analysis is discussed. The chapter briefly 
presents the definition of research, investigates quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
and mixed methods, and describes the reason the selected methodology was chosen over 
another. Lastly, the tool and data analysis techniques are described. 
Research 
Research as an activity that collects large quantities of information, explores cryptic theories, 
and constructs new products (Walliman, 2006). Research is also conducted to increase 
knowledge (Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar & Newton, 2002). This broadens the field of 
knowledge in each discipline in which it is conducted. 
Research Philosophies 
It is important to illustrate the rationale behind the selection of research philosophies and 
approaches (Dilley, 2004). First is the consideration that the study will be examined by 
dissertation committee members and institutional review boards who might follow diverse 
approaches and who must be convinced that the approach employed is suitable. 
Second, the selected framework should help the researcher understand what the strengths 
and weaknesses of the particular approach are (Dilley, 2004). Third, the researcher has to 
comply with the guidelines provided by the approach; deviations could be unscientific and 
could nullify the research. Lastly, the approach also prescribes the researcher’s role, whether 
he/she should reveal personal opinions or remain neutral (Dilley, 2004).  
The above statements advocate compliance and non-deviation to the research 
frameworks; however, the field of Information Systems (IS) had been employing 
philosophies and approaches from other subject areas whilst not necessarily understanding 
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the underlying assumptions (Dobson, 2002). This study will provide a summary of 
epistemology and ontology to illustrate the understanding of the two philosophies. 
 Epistemology is interested in how knowledge is acquired and what can be regarded as 
adequate knowledge (Walliman, 2006). It focuses on the association between the 
entity being observed and the observer (Corbetta, 2003).  
 Ontology is concerned with understanding of whether entities exist in their own right 
or of they only exist within the human mind (Corbetta, 2003).  
The figure below depicts the research pyramid as introduced by Jonker and Pennink (Jonker 
& Pennink, 2009). See Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Research pyramid (Source: Jonker & Pennink, 2009, p. 23) 
The pyramid portrays a graphical illustration of the research journey. It has four research 
levels—paradigms, methodology, methods, and techniques—that are a series of interrelated 
events and decisions, ranging from the abstract (paradigm) to more technical (techniques) 
events. The model, as proposed by Jonker and Pennink (2009), aims to inform the reader of 
the decisions that need to be taken as he/she progresses through the research journey and it 
also reveals the available alternatives to techniques and tools.   
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This study will elaborate on the four levels and demonstrate their applicability to this 
study. Literature from other sources will also be incorporated to strengthen the argument for 
the chosen research methods, but emphasis will be placed on information that is relevant to 
this study.  
Research Paradigm 
The term “research paradigm” is related to how the person performing the research observes 
reality (Gummesson, 1999). This is also referred to as the researcher’s basic approach. It 
comprises the underpinning rules and values that motivate the thinking and behaviour of the 
researcher (Gummesson, 1999). There are several types of paradigms or perspectives, as 
noted below: 
 Knowing through the eyes of someone else—means that the full facts only become 
known through proper examination of a phenomenon. An example of this is research 
that is conducted to measure how employees feel towards their employer.  
 Knowing through the eyes of the researcher—is where a researcher can create an idea 
of the reality through available literature and then later has the idea validated. An 
example of such research is this study. The researcher has an idea of the reality (state 
of DFR maturity models) and most of the information is available through literature, 
but the end result (model) will be tested with practitioners. This means that this study 
is made known by looking at research through the viewpoint of the researcher. There 
is no choice to be made in this particular paradigm. The nature of the research 
determines the paradigm.  
 The other approaches proposed are (a) positivism—conducting researching without 
considering implementation requirements, (b) constructivism—research conducted 
from within the confines of the subject and learning and growing with the subject, (c) 
empiricism—similar to positivism, but data and facts are emphasised without any 
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reliance on theory, and (d) interpretivism—research that suggests that events can be 
better understood if the people performing the action is placed in the social context 
(Kelliher, 2005).  
Research Methodology 
There are several definitions contextualised to define what is meant by research 
methodology. Mackenzie & Knipe, S. (2006), pp 193-205, summarise some of the definitions 
as (a) “the collection of methods or rules by which a particular piece of research is 
undertaken”, (b) “principles, theories and values that underpin a particular approach to 
research”, and (c) “the frame of reference for the research which is influenced by the 
‘paradigm in which our theoretical perspective is placed or developed’ ”. All of the above 
definitions are contextually correct and it can therefore be argued that a methodology 
highlights the direction to a destination, but that does not detail the associated steps. There 
are primarily two types of methodologies or approaches: qualitative and quantitative. 
However, the two approaches can be combined in a single research to examine different 
levels of the same phenomena. This combined methodology is called mixed methods 
(Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). 
Qualitative methodology 
Qualitative methodology is aimed to provide rich, in depth, and illustrative accounts of the 
investigated entity (Geertzt, 1973). It is specifically aimed at behavioural science to discover 
underlying intentions and motives (Goddard & Melville, 2004). 
In this study, the qualitative methodology has been adopted to understand the first part of 
the research question, namely: “What DFR structure (elements or domains) is needed by 
financial services businesses?” Table 2, in Chapter 2 of this study, lists the different 
frameworks and also highlights the approaches taken by each study. The approach and the 
framework employed in this study to answer the first parts of the research question are 
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consistent with approaches and frameworks taken by researchers cited from the reviewed 
literature. This study has therefore adopted the widely accepted approach based on Table 2.  
A qualitative methodology is used in this study to answer the second part of the research 
question, namely, “How can such a structure contribute to the design of a maturity 
assessment model?” The second part of the research question considers (a) the design process 
of a maturity assessment model and (b) the construction of the maturity matrix and it 
provides their definitions. Authors of relevant literature have suggested the use of interviews, 
Delphi studies, case studies, and focus groups to derive the characteristics of a maturity 
model (Pöppelbuß et al., 2011). This indicates a qualitative approach (Raber, Winter, & 
Wortmann, 2011). Furthermore, the use of words, open questions, and discussions are a more 
appropriate approach to gather the data required to populate the assessment model. 
Researchers of associated literature have discouraged the use of quantitative methods for 
designing maturity models because the researcher would have to employ valid data sets and 
have familiarity with statistical methods; hence, they are less often used for designing 
maturity models (Fraser, Moultrie, & Gregory, 2002). Lastly, the design process that this 
study followed is based on the design process recommended by authors of the literature 
consulted on this topic. Thus, the approach and framework taken in this study to answer the 
second part of the research question is consistent with approaches taken by similar research 
studies. 
Quantitative methodology 
This type of research is aimed at putting together events and volumes and looking at 
relationships between entities. It reduces the investigated entity to numerical values to 
perform statistical analysis (Gelo, Braakmann, & Benetka, 2008).  
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It is regarded as research that is based on facts reflected through exact figures (Jonker & 
Pennink, 2009). It is a strictly goal-oriented procedure which aims for objectivity (Flick, 
2011) and is based on the measurement of amount or quantity.  
Mixed methods approach 
This is the integration of qualitative and quantitative methodologies to garner a better 
understanding than is possible with either methodology alone (Creswell, 2003, p. 5). There 
are two major types of mixed methods (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 20): 
 Concurrent or simultaneous—this is where dissimilar research methods are integrated 
into one research to enable a singular interpretation of the results. 
 Sequential—this is where the research starts off with one method but is followed by 
another method or several other methods. 
According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), the following are rationales for 
conducting mixed methods research: 
 Triangulation—is the verification of results by employing different methods. 
 Complementarity—the findings of one method are clarified or enhanced by 
employing the results of another method. 
 Initiation—the achievement of new insights that will encourage new research 
questions. 
 Development—a method is shaped by the results of another method. 
 Expansion—the focus is to expand the scope and penetration of research by using 
dissimilar methods to investigate different angles of enquiry. 
Research Methods 
A method highlights specific phases or actions to be taken in a specific order during the 
research journey. It is the systematic approach to collect and analyse data to glean meaningful 
insights from the data presented (Jankowicz, 2000, p. 209).  
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According to literature, the main research methods are experiment, survey, case study, 
grounded theory, ethnographic and observational methods, and lastly, action research (Gable, 
1994; Kuo, Dunn, & Randhawa, 1999; Charmaz, 2007; Gelo et al., 2008). 
Experiment 
This is where the researcher makes conjectures about relationships between an unconnected 
anomaly and another (or more) connected anomaly(ies). It usually involves the manipulation 
of a variable or relationship (Gelo et al., 2008). This research is not involved in experiments 
or manipulation of relationships and as such this research method would be inappropriate for 
this study. 
Survey 
This is refers to a cluster of quantitative analysis methods where large quantities of data are 
collected using methods like questionnaires and interviews (Gable, 1994). This study requires 
in depth discussions and it must allow for new data to be discovered. Survey research is an 
inappropriate method for this study because surveys cannot be structured to provide depth 
and richness of the topic and this method does not allow the discovery of new data.   
Case study 
Case studies allow the researcher to collect in-depth information as they permit interviewees 
to describe experiences in their own manner and not in a manner prescribed by the researcher 
(Kuo, Dunn, & Randhawa, 1999). This study employed the case study method because it has 
been utilised by similar research (Pöppelbuß et al., 2011). Secondly, this approach is selected 
because all the other methods have been shown (see other research methods) to be 
inappropriate for this study.   
Grounded theory 
This approach allows the collection and analysis of data to happen simultaneously. This 
iterative approach between empirical data and results of analysis makes the data collection 
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more refined (Charmaz, 2007). This is an iterative approach that seeks to ground and refine 
the theory as new data becomes evident. This study will not have multiple iterations and 
therefore cannot be classified as grounded theory.  
Ethnographic and observational methods 
These are means of collecting data in which the researcher seeks to become part of a group 
and by being part of the group or the event, hopes to collect more data than would had been 
possible if the researcher was not part of the event or group (Vinten, 1994). This method is 
largly used to study groups of individuals or events as they happen. This study will not 
perform any of the mentioned actions and will therefore not utilise this method. 
Action research 
It is a free process that focuses on creating practical know-how in the search of 
meaningful social purposes (Reason & Bradbury, 2001). Action research can also be 
considered as the research that is concerned with the investigation alongside people rather 
than the investigation about people (Altrichter, Kemmis, McTaggart, Zuber-Skerritt, 2002). 
This study will not utilise action research because the study does not focus on people but it 
focuses on a process. 
Research Techniques 
This is an exact step-by-step procedure that can be taken to gather and analyse data for 
further exploration (Jankowicz, 2000, p. 211). There are (a) structured techniques—usually a 
series of questions with pre-set possible answers, and (b) semi-structured techniques—
usually a defined theme that allows for open responses. Techniques are use synonymously 
with tools or instruments (Jonker & Pennink, 2009, p. 25). 
Structured technique 
The following are the various types of structured techniques: 
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 Questionnaires—used for collecting large data with closed questions. They are 
usually used with a Likert-type scale. 
 Repertory grid—is similar to the questionnaire, but the researcher involves the subject 
in designing the questions. 
 Structured interview—different participants will be interviewed and confronted with 
the same question sets. 
 Structured observation—is mostly performed by machines such as electronic point-of-
sale applications that observe a user’s selection of products. 
Unstructured technique 
The following are the types of unstructured techniques: 
 Unstructured observation—implies the use of the respondent’s notes, diaries, and so 
forth. 
 Focus group—this is when a number of people are assembled to discuss a particular 
subject and the discussion is recorded. 
 Conversation—this tool is utilised when an informal conversation touches on the 
research topic. 
 Semi-structured interviews—are used when there is a particular theme and leading 
questions for the interview, but the interviewee allows for slight deviation in the 
theme to better understand the subject as a whole. This style opens itself for possible 
new discoveries which are otherwise not available with structured interviews.  
This study employed interviews to collect data from practitioners who are concerned 
with DFR. The interviews were both structured and semi-structured in nature. Literature 
concerned with developing assessment models suggested the use of interviews, Delphi 
studies, case studies, and focus groups to derive the characteristics of a maturity model 
(Pöppelbuß et al., 2011). This study selected this technique because the alternatives, such as 
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Delphi studies and focus groups required a convergence of participants in a central place, for 
multiple iterations. This was impossible to achieve without a sizeable budget (administration, 
venue, tools, refreshments, and so forth) and disruption to the lives of the participants, since 
some of them were located in other provinces. A case study technique would have been ideal, 
however most of the participants could not provide proprietary artefacts and one participating 
organisation did not have a formal forensic process. Thus this technique was the most 
feasible for this study. The interviews were both structured (to give direction) and semi-
structured (to allow for the discovery of new information). The  interviews were conducted 
with willing and available participants. The conversations were recorded during the interview 
and then transcribed post interview to enable the researcher to replay the conversations and to 
allow other researchers to access the same data.  
Instrument Design—Interview: 
Digital Forensic (DF) Practitioners within the Western Cape of South Africa were consulted 
and asked leading questions regarding domains and sub-domains within DFR, maturity 
levels, and their descriptions and measurement criteria (see Appendices 1 and 2 for the 
proposed question set and the models that initiate the discussions). The set of questions in 
Appendix 1 seeks to elicit responses that will enhance the proposed DFR framework. The 
questions in appendix 2 are designed so that participants select either a check-box (tick box) 
assessment approach or a quantitative assessment approach. The participants in the study 
used the check-box and the tick-box concepts interchangeably. 
Sample Design: 
Sample design is described as a plan to gather a sample from a population (Goddard & 
Melville, 2004). They further classify sampling as either probability sampling (there is an 
equal probability of inclusion in the sample) or non-probability sampling (probability of 
inclusion cannot be determined).  
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Examples of probability sampling are area sampling, systematic sampling, stratified 
sampling, and random sampling. On the other hand, quota sampling, judgement sampling, 
and convenience sampling are associated with non-probability sampling. 
The topic of forensic readiness is sensitive and few organisations are willing to have 
their forensic information publicised (Whyte & Claims, 2004). With this in mind, random 
sampling from a list of South African long-term and short-term insurance companies and of 
South African banks and private forensic companies was adopted for this study. The list of 
long- and short-term insurers was downloaded from the financial services board website 
(www.fsb.co.za) under the list registered insurers section and the list of banks was retrieved 
from the South African Reserve bank website (www.resbank.co.za) under the regulation and 
supervision section. The lists of private forensic companies were companies that were known 
to the researcher. 
The sampling process was markedly challenging since it was difficult to find the correct 
sample composition. The preferred sample composition consists of companies that 
 provide a financial service 
 have a digital forensic footprint  
 are willing and able to contribute to the study, and 
 are suitably knowledgeable about digital forensic readiness. 
With this constraint foremost in mind, the study interviewed a minimum of 10 
participants. Two of the interviewed participants are well-known, respected, and influential in 
the computer forensics circles in South Africa; and one of them has had several digital 
forensics articles published. The rest of the interviewees are all in leading positions within 
their respective organisations. The sample is therefore composed of well-connected and 
experienced participants. 
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Data Analysis: 
Data analysis is the process of reducing the data to a more manageable size so that common 
themes and patterns can be exploited (Cooper & Schindler, 2001, p. 82). This view is echoed 
by Goddard and Melville (2004), who suggested that data should be classified into purposeful 
and usable categories.  
Qualitative data analysis is not an easy, off-the-shelf, one-fits-all approach (Creswell, 
2007; Miles & Huberman, 1984). With this said, however, authors of research literature 
suggest that researchers (a) must organise the data, (b) become acquainted with the data, (c) 
classify or code the data, (4) interpret the data, (5) and present the data. 
Organising data: The audio recorded interviews were each transcribed into separate 
Word documents. A half an hour’s recording roughly translates to12 pages of transcription. 
Become acquainted with the data: The transcriptions were studied and edited for 
correctness. 
Classify the data: The data was classified into themes based on the DFR domains and 
each participant’s response was recorded against the particular domain.  
Interpret the data: The participant responses were analysed for consistency and 
conflicting views. The aim in this study was also to understand the relationships between 
respondent expertise, industry, feelings, and views.  
Data presentation: The key findings of this study will be presented in chapter 4.  
Unit of analysis 
The domains and sub-domains were the units of analysis. All questions and responses were 
organised under the domains and sub-domains. 
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Interviews 
In all, 10 interviews were held with 10 participants. Two interviews were performed through 
Skype because of the distance between interviewer and interviewee. Interviews lasted from 7 
to 36 minutes and were audio-recorded with the consent of the participants. 
Data management 
The management of data is important for qualitative research because it ensures validity, 
reliability, and transparency, and it ensures that the information is kept in a manner that 
allows other researchers to draw similar conclusions.  
The interviews were recorded electronically using an electronic voice recorder. The 
recordings were transferred to a laptop and stored under separate folders. Each folder housed 
the recordings and artefacts that were collected during the interview. Each folder was named 
to reflect the name of the participant(s), for example, an interview with consultant John Doe 
was named “DFR interview with John Doe”. The audio recordings were transcribed using 
Microsoft Office Word 2007 and the transcriptions were renamed consistently, according to 
archiving rules (Mack, Woodsong, Macquee, Guest, & Namey, 2005). 
The transcript name contained the site name, data-gathering method, practitioner 
category and a sequential number. For example, if the third interview was held with DF 
consultant John Doe at Pick ’n Pay offices, then the transcript name would be PPFICO03, the 
site name would be (PP) Pick ’n Pay offices, the data-gathering method would be (FI) formal 
interview, the practitioner category would be (CO) consultant, and the sequential number 
would be (03) third data collection interview. 
The transcription template (see appendix 3 to see an example) used in this study is an 
adaptation of a template based on the article Qualitative Research Methods: A Data 
Collector’s Field Guide (Mack et al., 2005, p.109).    
 
 
 
 
Ivan Claims        Page 71 of 142 
The Minnesota Oral History Association suggests several transcription conventions 
(Minnesota Historical Society, 1996). The following transcription conventions were adopted 
in this study: 
 Ellipsis points (…) which imply hesitation, changing a thought or uncertainty. 
Example: “I bought … how much did that cost?” 
 Square bracket ([ ]) is used to provide information that is not visible to the reader or to 
indicate that the narrator used a word that the narrator thinks was used. Example: 
“When the study [Unclear] subject three”. 
 EM dash (—) signifies that the speaker trailed off, did not finish the words or was 
permanently interrupted. For example, 
 “John: Can you— 
Mary: Where were you? 
John: I was at home, working on my assignment.” 
Data confidentiality  
Computer forensics is a sensitive subject for many organisations especially in a competitive 
market where forensic readiness can be considered a competitive advantage. Therefore, in 
this study, the identities of participants are withheld and a standard naming convention 
applied. All respondents are referred to as participants and a number is allocated them in the 
sequence of the interview. In other words, participant one was interviewed first and 
participant seven was interviewed seventh. The organisations in which the participants are 
employed are not named, but the industry in which the organisation operates is instead 
referred to.  
Summary of Chapter  
Data pertinent to the DFR structure and maturity assessment model was collected and 
presented. The DFR structure is encapsulated by the domains and sub-domains and as such 
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feed back to the research question. The domains also feed into the maturity assessment 
model.  
Data was collected through semi-structured interviews. The two open ended questions 
prompted discussions on the DFR domains and maturity assessment model. Random 
sampling was employed due to a lack of willing participants and expertise. The data was 
analysed and classified according to the DFR domain themes. The subsequent data will be 
utilised to design the maturity assessment model. 
In the following chapter (findings and presentation of results), the key findings of the 
data collection will be highlighted and discussed. 
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
This chapter presents the findings of data collected through interviews. The chapter is divided 
into three main sections. The first section addresses data confidentiality, sample selection, 
and the demographics of the participants. The middle section (Results) deals with the findings 
around the eight digital forensic readiness domains and their sub-domains. The domains and 
sub-domains represent the DFR structure and as such are associated to the research question. 
Each domain is discussed separately to keep the dialogue uncluttered.  
The last section focuses on practitioner responses to the two proposed maturity 
assessment models.  
Participant Demographic 
Tables 19 and 20 below illustrate the participant profile/demographics. 
Table 19 
Participant Demographics 
Participant Years of 
forensic 
experience 
 Industry where most 
forensic experience 
gained. 
Contributed 
forensically to more 
than one industry? 
Please state all 
Size of current 
company  
P1 5 Long-term insurance No > 10 000 
P2 8 Long-term insurance No 15,000 staff in SA 
and 40, 000 staff 
internationally 
P3 14 Not available Yes 1001 - 5000 
P4 20 Short-term insurance Not available > 2300 
P5 7 Not available Not available 501 - 1000 
P6 11 Banking  1001 - 5000 
P7 16 Law enforcement Yes, across several 
industries 
655 
P8 14 Public Sector, Mining Mining, Oil, Public 
Sector, Technology, 
Gaming 
N/A. Have retired 
P9 Participant information not available 
P10 14 Long-term insurance No About 3000 
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Table 20 
Participant Demographics (continued). 
Participant Highest 
forensic 
education 
Board member 
of any 
organisation in 
a forensic 
capacity 
Have implemented 
forensic measures that 
are widely adopted by 
an organisation 
Have 
recommended 
forensic 
measures that 
are utilised 
across 
industries 
P1 BCom 
Honours 
(Computer 
Forensics) 
No No No 
P2 BCom 
Honours 
(Computer 
Forensics) 
No Yes No 
P3 Mtech Yes Not available Not available 
P4 Not available Yes Not available Not available 
P5 BEng Not available Not available Not available 
P6 MBA Not available Not available Not available 
P7 Master’s 
degree 
Association of 
Certified Fraud 
Examiners 
Yes Yes 
P8 CISSP 
 
  
No Built the forensic 
framework for a large 
financial services 
organisation and done 
training for many 
organisations across 
the globe 
No 
P9 Participant information not available 
P10 Diploma in 
Criminal 
Justice & 
Forensic 
Auditing 
No Yes, one organisation No 
The above table displays the demographics of the participants. The table shows the 
industries in which they operate, their forensic experience, the size of the company, their 
highest forensic qualification, and so forth. The opinions of highly qualified, multi-industry, 
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experienced participants who have had their forensic work published and are board members 
in a forensic capacity are valuable. 
Results 
The objective of this section is to present the key responses to questions posed to answer the 
research question. The participants were presented with domains of the DFRCF and asked 
how the model might be refined. Responses to the open-ended question (Find the above 
domains: how would you improve on them and can the sub-domains be further refined?) 
stimulated more discussions between the interviewer and subjects. The resultant discussions 
encouraged the practitioners to improve the model by moving the domains and sub-domains 
around, renaming or discarding them. The expected outcome was a well-thought through, 
vetted DFRCF and DFR maturity assessment model that satisfied the need of this study. 
For ease of reading, the study highlighted the changes proposed by the participants. 
Borders with dashed lines were drawn around elements that (a) were moved from one domain 
to another, (b) experienced name changes, and (c) introduced as new elements for the first 
time. See Figure 9 below as an example.  
 
Figure 9: Legend illustrating the types of changes proposed by participants. 
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DFR Domains and Sub-Domains (DFR Structure) 
Strategy domain  
Six of the participants agreed completely with the elements presented and did not propose 
any changes. These participants originate from the following industries: long term insurance, 
short-term insurance, investment services, banking, and risk consultancy. Figure 10 illustrates 
the proposed elements. 
Strategy
Org anisation 
structure
DFR Strategy
Objectives & 
goals
Methodology
 
Figure 10: Proposed Strategy domain with its sub-domains. 
The public sector was the only industry that proposed changes to the Strategy domain. 
The proposed changes were minor as the participant suggested that the DFR strategy and 
methodology should be combined and renamed Strategic framework.  
Participant 8 agreed with the original proposal but suggested that business requirements 
move from the Legal requirements domain to the Strategy domain. On the other end of the 
spectrum were participants 1 and 2, who dismissed the entire domain. The reason for this 
omission remains unexplained, but the size of their multinational long-term insurance 
organisation might provide a hint to their complex operating environment, which probably 
requires a different structure to those of smaller organisations. 
Legal requirements domain  
Figure 11 below illustrates the original proposed domain and sub-domains. 
Legal 
requirements
Legislation Laws
Judiciary 
requirements
Business 
requirements
 
Figure 11: Proposed elements of the Legal requirements domain. 
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Changes proposed by participants New element proposed 
Changes proposed by participants New element proposed 
This domain encouraged a good deal of discussion and there were various views on what 
the domain should look like. The following are some of the changes encouraged by the 
participants. 
  
Legal 
requirements
& policies
Legislative 
requirements
DFR policies Procedures Processes 
E-comms  
policy
 
Figure 12: View expressed by participant number 4. 
Participant 4 had the most disparate view, as shown by Figure 12 and compared against 
the original model (Figure 11). The participant who is employed in the short-term insurance 
industry suggested that the Policy and the Legal requirements domain be merged, saying, 
“Most of your policies are derived from legislation. You definitely got this link between policy 
and legislation. There must be a link. So can I do that for you?” and “So policy and legal 
requirements generally go hand-in-hand”.  
Following his recommendation, the domain was renamed Legal requirements and 
policies and the legal sub-domains (legislation, laws, and judicial requirements) were also 
combined and renamed Legislative requirements. Furthermore, the participant also included 
the Electronic communications policy as part of the domain—hence the clear-coloured 
element.   
Participant 7 (employed in the public sector) revealed a thorough understanding of the 
intention of the domain and the subjects within the domain. Figure 13 reflects his position.  
Legal 
requirements
Statutory law Common law Case law 
Constitutional 
law
 
Figure 13: Participant 7’s view on Legal requirements 
The participant renamed all the following sub-domains: Legislation became Statutory 
law, Laws became Common law, and Judicial requirements became Case law. 
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Similarly, participant 8 also used the term Case law to describe the prevailing 
philosophy around court cases: “I would have something separate that says case law or 
current thinking in terms of court.” The words current thinking were used to stress that courts 
have a manner of interpreting cases or evidence and that companies must take cognisance of 
such thinking (ideas) and ensure that their evidence meets these ideological parameters. 
Participant 8 continued on this track by including a new sub-domain: Judicial readiness.  
Participant 7 also introduced a new sub-domain: Constitutional law. The idea is that all 
laws are subject to it and as such must be factored in policy designs. The exact words were “I 
think, in any organisation, that doing some sort of legal issue around forensic readiness, the 
constitution has to be considered issue”. 
Both participants 7 and 8 removed Business requirements from the domain. The 
understanding is that the business requirements are ultimately a reflection of the legal 
requirements.  
In summary, the elements that enjoyed the most consensuses are displayed in Table 21 
below.  
Table 21 
Legislative Domain—Elements That Received the Highest Consensus 
Element Number of consensuses 
Legislation 7 
Judicial requirements 7 
Laws 6 
Business requirements 5 
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New element 
proposed 
Elements moved 
New element proposed New element proposed 
Governance domain  
Participants 4 (short-term insurance) and 5 (investment company) agreed completely with the 
proposed Governance domain and made no changes (see Figure 14 for the proposed domain 
model). 
Governance Governance 
controls
Evidence 
management
Incident cost 
technique
 
Figure 14: Governance domain of the DFRCF. 
Participants 9 and 10 suggested only minor changes which entailed the removal of the 
Incident cost technique sub-domain. Their particular forensic unit within the organisation (a 
large insurer) is mandated to investigate each and every incident that is directed to them. 
Their business requirements dictate that all incidences are investigated and they argue that 
this element is solely appropriate in an event where the investigation is outsourced.  
Respondent 10 observed, “So it is not as if we are going to outsource our services and 
we need to attach a cost structure.” This view was echoed by a colleague, respondent 10, 
who said, “We are not going to be a consultant [contact] or something”. 
Thus, it is pertinent to note that all three participants (participants 3, 7, and 8), who are 
forensic consultants, proposed significant changes to the model (see their respective models 
in Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 17) 
Governance
Governance 
controls
Incident cost 
technique
Audit reportCompliance
Risk 
assessment
 
Figure 15: Governance domain according to participant 3.  
 
Governance
Governance 
controls
Evidence 
management
Governance 
systems
Governance 
framework
Incident 
management
 
Figure 16: Governance domain according to participant 7. 
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Changes 
proposed 
Elements moved New element 
proposed 
Governance
Governance 
controls
Evidence 
management
Incident 
management
Risk 
assessment
Best practice
 
Figure 17: Governance domain according to participant 8. 
All three above participants agreed that governance controls should be part of the 
domain. Two agreed that evidence management should remain within the domain and both 
recognised the value of having an incident management sub-domain. The tallied argument 
was, "Once you have identified that you have an incident, what needs to happen then?” 
Hence, the addition of the incident management to illustrate that a process is available that 
describes how, what, and when incidences need to be managed.  
The Risk assessment element was moved from the Systems and events domain to the 
Governance domain by participant 3 and 8. Participant 3 argued that the King III Report 
(code of global best practices for corporate governance in South Africa) places the activity of 
risk assessment under governance so this model should be added as a best practice standard: 
“The King III Report, the governance thing? Risk assessment there will fall under 
governance”. 
Other new elements that were introduced were: Governance systems, Governance 
framework (by participant 7), Best practice (by participant 8) and Compliance by participant 
3. Participant 3 maintained that compliance is an integral part of governance but admitted that 
governance was not his area of expertise: “I am not an expert on governance issues and those 
types of things”.  
On the other hand, participant 7, who “deal[s] with compliance on a regular basis”, did 
not incorporate it under governance, but kept the Compliance domain separate.  
In summary, the elements that drew the highest consensus are displayed in Table 22 
below.  
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Table 22 
Governance Domain—Elements that Received the Highest Consensus  
Element Number of consensuses 
Governance controls 8 
Evidence Management 7 
Incident cost technique 3 
Risk assessment 3 
Systems and events domain  
Figure 18 below illustrates the proposed Systems and events domain model that was 
presented to the interviewees.  
Systems & 
Events
Systems Infrastructure Network
Risk 
assessment
Events Laboratory
 
Figure 18: Proposed elements of the Systems and events domain. 
Participants 9 and 10 agreed completely with the proposed model and had no changes. 
Participants 4, 5, and 6 agreed with the complete model, but discarded the Risk assessment 
element from the domain. Participant 4 is a practitioner in the short-term insurance field and 
participant 5 is a practitioner in the investment industry. Although the participants hail from 
dissimilar industries, their thinking is aligned, as both of them created a new domain and 
moved the Risk assessment element to the new domain. This could signify that the DFR 
structure is fairly similar for these two industries and that the DFRCF model might apply to 
both. This is also evident in their responses to the reasons for moving the Risk assessment 
element out of the Governance domain (see Table 23). 
Both participants are of the opinion that the business and risk environment has to be 
understood, and that mitigations should be put in place to deal with said risk exposure. 
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Elements moved New element proposed 
Table 23 
Illustrates Similar Comments Made by Participants 4 & 5  
Participant Participant response Line # Transcript 
file 
Participant 4 …you will analyze your 
environment; what the defects are, what 
need to be done to keep those 
defects…What are the typical risks or 
exposure…How will you mitigate those 
risks? 
137, 
138, 
141-143, 
158, 159 
MFFIPR04 
Participant 5 …it should cover the understanding 
of the business environment, it should 
understand the typical risk in that 
environment, how the risk should be 
mitigated … highlight control 
deficiencies, and then put actions in place 
6-10 N/A 
The only changes made to the domain name came from participants 1 and 2, who 
renamed the domain Technology. The reasons for the name change could not be confirmed 
with the participants; however, it is possible that it has to do with the fact that the Events 
element was removed from their model and thus needed to be renamed to avoid confusion 
(see Figure 19 below). 
Technology Equipment Systems Infrastructure Network
 
Figure 19: Systems and events—comments made by participants 1 and 2. 
The most extensive comments were received from participant 7, who is the most senior and 
most recognised forensic authority included in this study. The participant has also published 
various research articles related to DFR, some of which have been cited in this study (see 
Figure 20 for an illustration of his interpretation).  
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Elements 
moved New element proposed 
Systems & 
Events
Tecnological
systems
Infrastructure Network
Risk 
assessment
Events DF capacity
Organisation
systems
Workflow
systems
 
Figure 20: Systems and events—comments made by Participant 7. 
The participant renamed Laboratory to DF capacity. He argued that laboratories are only 
found in large organisations and that laboratory refers to a physical structure, which is not 
always the case for smaller organisations. Hence, it should be renamed DF capacity as the 
domain actually seeks to ensure that there is some form of forensic ability and skill, rather 
than being a facility. The participant also proposed that the Systems element should be sub-
divided into Technological systems, Organisation systems, and Workflow systems. 
In summary, the elements that enjoyed the most consensuses in this domain are reflected 
in Table 24 below.  
Table 24 
Systems and Events Domain—Elements Receiving the Highest Consensus  
Element Consensuses total 
Infrastructure 9 
Network 9 
Systems 7 
Events 7 
Laboratory 5 
 
Policy Domain  
Figure 21 illustrates the proposed Policy domain model that was presented to the 
interviewees.  
Policy DFR policies Procedures Processes 
 
Figure 21: Proposed elements of the Policy domain. 
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This study understands that consistency enhances the reading experience; however, due to the 
number of changes and additions to this domain, this study will change the presentation of the 
results to a tabular format to enable the display of multiple data.   
Table 25 below is an illustrative view of participant responses to the proposed Policy 
domain. The table headers are explained as follows: 
 Element refers to the sub-domain; the terms are used interchangeably in this study to 
enable better reading. For example, “the Risk assessment sub-domain was moved to 
the Governance domain” reads better as “the Risk assessment element was moved to 
the Governance domain”. 
 Type distinguishes between (1) proposed—the original elements that were proposed 
to the participants, (2) moved—elements that were shifted around between domains, 
(3) changed—elements that were modified by the participant, and (4) new—elements 
that are introduced to the model for the first time. 
 P1-P10 are participant numbers from 1 to 10. 
Table 25 
Proposed Elements of the Policy Domain 
Element Type P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
DFR policies Proposed √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Procedures Proposed √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Processes Proposed √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Escalation policy Moved √ √ √   √  √   
Evidence management Moved   √        
Incident cost technique Moved      √     
Business requirements Moved         √ √ 
Legal policies Changed   √        
Procedural policies New   √        
Reporting processes New   √        
E-comms policy New    √ √      
Technical standards New        √   
Guidelines New        √   
Best practice New        √   
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Elements moved New element proposed 
All participants agreed entirely with the proposed model, except participant 3, who renamed 
DFR policies to Legal policies.  
This was, however, not the only name change to this domain. Not shown on the table 
was the proposed name change of the entire domain by participants 1, 2, and 6. All three 
participants opted for Policies and procedures.  
Half (five) of the participants moved the Escalation policy element from the Monitor and 
report domain to the Policy domain. The arguments were that as a policy, it should be moved 
to the Policy domain. 
Participant number 8 argued that a sequence existed between the elements and that the 
model should be redesigned to reflect this. He suggested the following order: policy at the 
top, followed by process, procedure, standards and, lastly, guidelines (see Figure 22 that 
exemplifies his view). 
Policy DFR policy Processes Procedures 
Escalation 
policy 
Best practice
Technical
standards
Guidelines
 
Figure 22: Participant 8’s view on the Policy domain. 
In summary, the proposed domains were accepted by all participants; however, most 
added other policy related elements to the domain. The Escalation policy was the element 
that was added by most of the participant. 
Compliance domain  
Figure 23 illustrates the proposed Compliance domain model that was presented to the 
interviewees.  
Compliance Audit report
 
Figure 23: Proposed elements of the Compliance domain (Source: Author). 
Table 26 below is a matrix of participant responses to the proposed Compliance domain. 
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Table 26 
Compliance Domain—Matrix of Participant Responses  
Element Type P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Audit report Proposed √ √   √  √  √ √ 
Internal audit report Changed        √   
External audit report Changed        √   
Regulations New        √   
Internal fraud combat policy New         √ √ 
Compliance report New         √ √ 
Most participants agreed with the inclusion of the Audit report element in this domain; 
however, several changes were desired. 
Participants 9 and 10, who are practitioners in the long-term insurance field and whose 
organisation is in the initial phases of adopting DFR, have included two new elements: 
Internal fraud combat policy and compliance report. Apart from regulation and legislation 
compliance, their organisation also requires the forensic unit to comply with its internal fraud 
combat policy. None of the other participants elected an internal policy. It is possible that 
other organisations have similar internal policies; however, they understand that this domain 
is tasked with validating compliance and producing outputs as validation. An element such as 
an internal fraud combat policy is an input into compliance checking and not an output, 
unless a separate report is required to form the Compliance domain to feed into the internal 
combat policy for reporting purposes. But then a name change is advised, from internal fraud 
combat policy to internal fraud combat report. This would convey the message that this 
particular report communicates fraud combat non-compliance issues. 
Participant 3’s response is not mapped on the matrix as he moved the entire Compliance 
domain into the Governance domain and thus does not have a separate compliance domain. 
Similarly, participant 6 moved Compliance to the Legal domain. Participant 4 did have a 
Compliance domain on his model but with no sub-domains underneath it.  
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Training domain  
Figure 24 illustrates the proposed Training domain model that was presented to the 
interviewees.   
Training Awareness Training Accreditation 
 
Figure 24: Proposed elements of the Training domain. 
The matrix in Table 27 below is a representation of participant responses to the proposed 
Training domain. 
Table 27 
Training Domain—Matrix of Participant Responses  
Element Type P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Awareness Proposed √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Training Proposed √ √  √ √ √  √ √ √ 
Accreditation Proposed   √ √ √ √  √ √ √ 
Investigative training Changed   √        
Forensic training Changed       √    
Forensic accreditation Changed       √    
 
The domain is an uncomplicated domain, and the participant responses reflect that. Most (6) 
agreed completely with the proposed elements, and those that did not opted for clarifying 
element names. An example is the name change of the Training element to Investigative 
training by participant 3 or the name change to Forensic training by participant 7. Participant 
7 renamed the Accreditation element to Forensic accreditation. 
Monitor and report domain  
Figure 25 illustrates the proposed Monitor and report domain model that was presented to the 
interviewees.  
 
 
 
 
Ivan Claims        Page 88 of 142 
Monitor & 
report
Escalation 
policy
Tools
Reporting 
criteria
 
Figure 25: Proposed elements of the Monitor and report domain. 
The matrix in Table 28 below is a representation of participant responses to the proposed 
Monitor and report domain. 
Table 28 
Monitor and Report Domain—Matrix of Participant Responses  
Participants 1 and 2 had a dissimilar view to the proposed model. They only included the 
Audit report element in this domain. The Escalation policy was moved to the Policy domain, 
based on the DFR checklist that was provided by the participant. This was the only artefact 
provided by the participants. The artefact is a maturity checklist with particular questions that 
will enable the organisation to rate its maturity. The artefact is, to a very large degree, a 
version of the checklist used by Wheeler (2010). The DFR checklist is not an academic 
document, but it is implemented and utilised by a very large insurance organisation and, as 
such, was included in this study (see Appendix 4 to examine the checklist). 
Element Type P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Tools Proposed    √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Escalation policy Proposed    √ √  √  √ √ 
Reporting criteria Proposed   √  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Audit report Moved √ √    √     
Monitoring report Changed   √        
Laboratory accreditation New   √        
Monitoring requirements New        √   
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Domain changes 
This study was initiated with eight domains and participants were invited to respond to open-
ended questions structured around the proposed domains. However, participants who are 
forensic practitioners of various industries (see Tables 19 & 20) have suggested domain name 
changes and the addition of several other domains to the model and hierarchies to the model. 
Name changes and additions. Table 29 below shows the domains that have been 
changed or added by participants. The table shows the old name, new name, new elements in 
it and the participant who proposed the change. This table is useful for further discussion to 
unlock the rationale behind the changes and to highlight any new elements that were 
previously not identified by literature (to be discussed in chapter 6). These elements should 
be considered when redesigning the DFRCF model and DFR maturity assessment model in 
answer to the research question. 
Table 29 
Domain Changes – Based on Participant Responses  
Old domain 
name 
New domain name 
New sub-domains (elements) 
introduced 
Participant 
Policy Policies & 
procedures 
n/a P1, P2 
Legal requirements Legal & regulatory n/a P1, P2 
Legal requirements Legal requirements 
& policies 
Electronic communications policy P4 
Legal requirements 
and Policy 
Legal compliance Regulations P6 
Systems & events Technology Equipment P1, P2 
Training Training & education n/a P1, P2 
n/a Group support Exco buy-in P1, P2 
n/a Lab management Copies & standard build; Acquisition 
tool tests; Asset inventory 
P1, P2 
n/a Auditing & logging Forensic findings; Event auditing,  P1, P2 
n/a Public relations & 
messaging 
Fraud awareness; Press statements P1, P2 
n/a Risk Management n/a P4, P5 
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The proposed name changes are both clarifying in nature and subjective. Examples of this 
are: Policy to Policies and procedure, Legal requirements to Legal and regulatory or Training 
to Training and Education. 
Group support was re-introduced as a main domain, with Executive buy-in as the sub-
domain. Yet executive support is encapsulated in the Strategy domain under DFR strategy, as 
suggested by literature. However, it could be argued that group support is crucial for large 
companies and, as such, deserves to be prioritised, something that might not be necessary in 
small organisations. 
Hierarchy within the proposed model. Participant 6, a forensic practitioner in the 
banking industry, suggested a hierarchy structure based on the Plan, Do, Check, Act cycle. 
Figure 26 below represents his view. 
 
Figure 26: Plan, do, check, act cycle hierarchy proposed by participant 6. 
Participant 6 said, “If you look at any best practice stuff, they usually use those plan, do, 
check, and act.” The participant was demonstrating that the DFRCF model should be 
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reorganised to represent a cycle of continuous improvement, as a best practice, based on the 
Deming cycle of continuous improvement.  
The cycle is a methodology that is utilised by organisations to continuously improve 
their products and processes (Deming, 1982). 
Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) maturity assessment model. The objective of the 
second part of the research question is the utilisation of the DFR structure (domain elements) 
to design a DFR maturity assessment model is. To enable this, the study must  
 Understand whether a checklist approach or a qualitative approach was more 
appropriate for the assessment model. 
 Understand what the descriptions for the maturity levels are. 
To fulfil the above two objectives, two maturity assessment models were proposed, and 
participants were prompted for opinions (see Appendix 2 for the full models). The following 
are key descriptions of the different approaches and models.  
 
Figure 27: Approach one: the check-box (tick-box) approach.  
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Figure 27 describes the bullet point approach maturity assessment model. The model has 
two main headings: Domains and Maturity Levels. The domains are the elements that will be 
assessed on the model and the maturity levels are the matrix against which the domains will 
be measured. The domains are divided into major domains and sub-domains. The major 
domain is the high level grouping of related, detailed sub-domains. There are five maturity 
levels, ranging from level 1 to level 5. 
Level 1 is defined as non-existent and it is typically characterised as having no 
formalisation, no as-and-when processes, no documentation, and so on. 
Level 2 is defined as basic and is characterised by low formalisation, repeatable 
processes, basic documentation, and so on. 
Level 3 is defined as intermediate and is characterised as having standardised forensics, 
documented processes, formal training, and so on. 
Level 4 is described as advanced and is typified as having forensics that is endorsed by 
Executive members, has process improvement measures, and so on 
Level 5 is the highest level of the model and is described as full; the characteristics are 
amongst other continuous process improvement objectives, formal staff training and 
accreditation, and so on (see Appendix 2 for the full matrix). 
Figure 28, below is the second approach: the qualitative approach  
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Figure 28: Qualitative approach—maturity assessment model. 
Figure 28 describes the qualitative approach to the maturity assessment model. The 
model is similar to the previous bullet point approach, apart from the level characteristics. All 
levels are characterised by narrative, descriptive sentences and the model relies on the 
interpretation of the assessor. The process of rating is a qualitative exercise. The narrative 
increases with each higher level. 
Level 1 – non-existent is characterised by a narrative that describes the absence of the 
particular element. For example, the domain strategy implies that an organisation needs a 
corporate/overall DFR strategy. The narrative for level would be “No DFR strategy in 
place”. 
For Level 2, it would be “There is an undocumented tacit strategy that is communicated 
informally and ad-hoc”.  
For Level 3, it would be “The documented strategy is endorsed by executive 
management”. This would be communicated to IT/forensic staff when joining the 
organisation. 
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This is the trend for the model (see Appendix 2 for the full matrix). 
The following open-ended questions were posed to participants to gather the data needed 
to understand the approach selection: Which maturity assessment model would you prefer 
and why and how can the maturity levels be further refined to illustrate an escalation from 
non-existence to full maturity?  
Their responses to the selection of the assessment approach were varied, as illustrated by 
Table 30 below. 
Table 30 
Responses to the Two Approaches  
Approach P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Check-box, bullet-point   √ √ √    √ √ 
Qualitative (words)      √     
Combination approach √ √     √ √   
 
Half (5) of the participants preferred the bullet point approach where the subject can tick off a 
list and understand the maturity level in such a fashion. Participants nine and ten argued that 
the qualitative approach was too open for various interpretations and the bullet point 
approach gives them an indication of what is under rating. They also conceded that the 
selection was based on their level of knowledge of the subject and they would prefer more 
guidance in implementation then rating. Their organisation is in the early phase of DFR 
implementation. 
Four participants selected a combination of both the qualitative and tick-box approach. 
This means that a third approach was designed by the participants. This new combination 
approach was selected by participants in the insurance and private consultancy industries.  
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Participant 6, from the banking industry, was the only respondent, who opted for the 
qualitative approach, saying, “People come with a check list mentality. Then you will say I do 
have this I have some of that but there will always be something missing”. The participant 
argued that the check-box approach stifles out-of-the-box thinking and thus will cause 
information to be overlooked.  
Below are all the participant’s rationales for accepting or rejecting the bullet point 
approach (see Table 31). 
Table 31 
Responses to the Check-Box Approach  
In support Against Participant 
Gives indication of what needs to 
be addressed. 
 P9, P10 
It is easier.  P5 
It is fleshed out nicely. It gives 
you a roadmap. 
 P4 
It is a standard way of assessing 
maturity. More clearly stated 
than the other approach. It fits in 
with other models. 
 P3 
 Assessors will have a checkbox 
mentality and not think outside the 
box. It will overlook information. You 
will get wrong answers. 
P6 
 Definitions/bullet points are 
problematic as they can create 
overlaps. Levels must be aligned and 
show clear ascension. 
P8 
Nice tick box and auditors love 
this. It is easy to determine 
levels. More comprehensive then 
qualitative approach. For people 
who are new to forensics. 
It can’t be used across industries. P7 
You can do self-assessments  P1, P2 
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Below are all the participant’s rationales for accepting or rejecting the qualitative approach 
(see Table 32). 
Table 32 
Responses to the Qualitative Approach  
In support Against Participan
t 
 Too open for different interpretations P9, P10 
It is a better approach. It is based 
on a feeling that we have. It is 
subjective. 
 P6 
 Too easy to move up a level. P8 
It is more generic A lot more difficult to monitor. Requires 
very skilled assessors. More for skilled 
people. 
P7 
 
In summary, the semi-structured interviews were instrumental in collecting data relating 
to DFR structure (domains and sub-domains) and the assessment matrix. The overall 
objective of the study, as encapsulated in the research question, “What DFR structure 
(components or domains) is needed by financial services businesses, and how can such a 
structure contribute to the design of a maturity assessment model that satisfies the goals and 
objections of DFR?”  was met by the data collection process. 
The data collection process uncovered that half of the participants preferred the check-
box (tick-box) approach and four participants selected a combination of the two approaches. 
Only one participant felt that the qualitative approach was preferred. None of the participants 
rejected or offered alternative maturity levels.   
Chapter Summary 
This chapter illustrated the results of the interviews with forensic practitioners. Several key 
changes were communicated by the participants. A demographic was also compiled to 
understand the participant’s level of influence in the digital forensic environment. In the next 
chapter, the results of the interviews will be discussed in detail.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents the findings of the research study. In it, conclusions are drawn and 
suggestions and recommendations made for future research. 
Discussion of Findings 
This study was intended to investigate the structure that is necessary to implement digital 
forensic readiness and how such a structure might be useful in the design of a maturity 
assessment model. To achieve this, the existing DFR frameworks were analysed and the 
DFRC framework extended according to the findings of the analysis. The structure of the 
extended DFRCF was utilised to design a DFR maturity assessment model.  
The maturity assessment model and domains were refined through interactive semi-
structured interviews with forensic practitioners. The findings from the interviews were 
presented in Chapter 5. In the following subsection, the DFR domains are discussed.  
DFR Domains (Structure) 
Strategy 
The purpose of this domain is to select a methodology for evidence collection, an 
organisation structure that reflects the reporting lines of the forensic unit, a forensic strategy, 
buy-in from executive level, and business requirements that reflect the goal and objectives of 
the organisation (Grobler et al., 2010b). 
The above objectives are best encapsulated by Figure 29 and so this revised model is the 
final version of the domain. 
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Strategy
Org anisation 
structure
Strategic 
framework
Objectives & 
goals
Business 
requirements
 
Figure 29: Strategy domain and elements (Source: Author). 
The union of the DFR strategy and Methodology sub-domains was a sound decision. As 
mentioned by participants 1 and 2, not all organisations have a specific DFR strategy, but 
they most likely will have a forensic strategy or another strategy that addresses the same 
issues. The use of the term DFR was too specific so was elevated to make it more generic. 
The use of the words strategic framework implies strategy, method, and, better yet, a 
framework in which evidence will be collected, based on a strategic mandate.  
Legal 
Although this domain evoked a wide range of responses, it highlighted a very consistent 
focus on compliance to laws, legislation, and regulations. The conversations resulted in the 
disentanglement of the above three terms. The above three terms were terms that were 
applicable to other countries and not entirely relevant in the South African context. 
Legislation was renamed Statutory laws, Laws was renamed Common law, and Judicial 
requirements were renamed Case law. 
Participants 1 and 2 suggested the renaming of the domain to Legal and regulatory. The 
argument was that organisations must not only consider laws but must also consider 
regulations, such as the electronic communications policy or the Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard (PCIDSS). The PCIDSS is a security standard by which organisations 
abide to ensure maximum security for online credit card transmissions (PCI, 2013). 
Therefore, a decision was made, for this study, to extend the sub-domains by including a 
Regulation sub-domain and changing the domain name to Legislation and regulation (Figure 
30). One participant suggested the amalgamation of Legal and Compliance. Although these 
two domains seem to examine the same set of information (laws), they must remain separate 
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as they have dissimilar focus points. The Legal domain ensures that business requirements 
and the DF strategy are considering legislative issues for implementation. Compliance 
focuses on examining the extent to which an organisation has fulfilled the requirements of 
practices and legislation (Bonanzi et al., 2010).    
Statutory law Common law Case law 
Legislation & 
Regulation
Regulations
 
Figure 30: Legislation and regulation domain and elements. 
Governance 
The domain ensures that an organisation establishes DF policy frameworks and that the 
policies and policy frameworks are implemented according to agreed standards. The Incident 
cost techniques element was renamed to Incident management. The previous name was too 
granular and conveyed the understanding that the cost technique was the only item under 
discussion. Participants suggest that there are more underlying activities such as what, how 
and when one is going to deal with incidents.  
This study has extended the Governance domain and the final version is depicted in 
Figure 31.  
Governance
Governance 
controls
Evidence 
management
Best practice
Governance 
framework
Incident 
management
 
Figure 31: Governance domain and elements. 
Systems and events 
The domain ensures the classification of hardware, software, processes, and events that house 
potential evidence. Moreover, as Rowlingson (2004) noted, this domain ensures that a risk 
assessment is performed at business level. The prevailing sentiment among participants was 
that Infrastructure, Network, Systems, Events and Laboratory must remain within the 
domain.  
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Participant 7 suggested that the Systems element be divided into three separate sub-
domains: Technological systems, Organisation systems and Workflow systems. The proposed 
name changes will be overlooked by this study because it is possible that other types of 
systems are in use in different organisations and the grounds for the particular breakdown this 
study have not been established. However, the suggestion to rename Laboratory to DF 
capacity was accepted as prudent for this study. As mentioned earlier, this domain seeks to 
ensure that there is some form of forensic ability and skill, rather than a facility. 
This study has extended the Systems and events domain and the final model is depicted 
in Figure 32.  
Systems & 
Events
Systems Infrastructure Network Events DF capacity
 
Figure 32: Systems and events domain and elements (Source: Author). 
Policy 
Policies that guide user behaviour within an organisational context must be established. 
Various policies are applicable to DFR (Barske et al., 2011), as mentioned in Chapter 3 of 
this study. 
Table 33 illustrates all the elements proposed in this study. They have been grouped to 
show compatibility and ease of reference. 
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Table 33 
Systems and Events Domain and Elements  
Policy Procedure Process Standards Guideline 
Best 
practice 
DFR policy Procedure Process Technical 
standards 
Guidelines Best 
practice 
Escalation policy Incident cost 
technique 
Reporting 
process 
   
Evidence 
management 
policy 
 
    
Legal policy 
 
    
E-comms policy 
 
    
Incident 
management 
policy 
 
    
 
It is impractical to display the level of detail as proposed by the various responses into a 
single model, especially since all the elements can be described by meaningful groupings. As 
an example, under the Policy grouping, it becomes clear that all the elements listed 
underneath it are policies, but with varied focuses, and it is thus efficient to refer to all the 
different polices as Policy.  
This study will utilise the above groupings to populate the Policy domain.  
See Figure 33 below for the final refined model. 
Policy & 
procedure
Policies Procedures Processes Standards Guidelines Best practices
 
Figure 33: Policy and procedure domain and elements. 
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Compliance 
The element of compliance does not feature strongly in previously published literature, and 
the few times it is mentioned, it is mentioned in the context of staff adherence towards 
policies and not as a separate element that assesses the effectiveness of controls. This means 
there might be a policy, and staff might adhere to it, but no effective controls exist to measure 
it against the IT objectives. 
Grobler et al. (2010a) introduced the discussion around control measures, and 
participants’ responses indicate a need for a separate focus on this element. All participants 
agreed that there must be a Compliance main domain, but it was participants 3 and 6 who 
preferred that Compliance be treated as a sub-domain. 
Participant 3 proposed that the Compliance domain reside within the Governance 
domain; however, this study has already demonstrated the need to keep these two domains 
separate (see Chapter 0). 
Participant 6 argued that the Compliance element should move to the Legal requirements 
domain. As mentioned, compliance has a separate focus, that is, measuring the controls put in 
place, and this cannot reside within a legal context.  
The interpretation that regulations should be considered within this domain was not 
expressed by other participants, except by participant 8, who argued that compliance should 
ensure that an organisation complies with laws and regulations. However, in this study, it is 
argued that the objective of the Compliance domain is not to re-evaluate conformance to legal 
requirements: this is already performed within the Legal requirements domain. 
The final refinement to this domain is shown in Figure 34. The Audit element refers to 
internal audits and external audits. The compliance report is an output of the audit 
investigation. Typically an audit would be performed to check company compliance to 
policy, procedure and legislation (Bonanzi, et al., 2010). After which a report (compliance 
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report, audit report, findings report, or whatever the organisation decides to name it) would 
be produced (Kochan, 1993). This study did not use audit reports as most people view audit 
reports as documents that are prepared by external parties and professionals (Auditors) and as 
such would not see that it can also refer to a report generated by a compliance officer. 
Compliance report refers to any type of report generated after an audit was performed, 
irrespective if it was performed by professionals (Auditors) or non-professional (Compliance 
officer, administrative staff).  
Legal
compliance
Audit
Compliance 
report
 
Figure 34: Compliance domain and elements. 
Training 
The Training domain is uncomplicated and all participants accepted the proposed model. 
There were two suggestions to rename Training as Forensic training and Investigative 
training. Another opinion was to rename Accreditation as Forensic accreditation.  
The Training element will be renamed Forensic training and the Accreditation element 
will remain as such because accreditation in this regard not only refers to forensic 
accreditation but also to laboratory accreditation. Laboratory accreditation is becoming more 
evident in later research. See Figure 35 for the final refinement in this domain. 
Training Awareness
Forensic 
training
Accreditation 
 
Figure 35: Training domain and elements (Source: Author) 
 
 
 
 
Ivan Claims        Page 104 of 142 
Monitor and reporting 
This completion of this domain elicits the organisation’s incident response reports, 
reporting criteria, and the tools to perform intrusion detection, and it ensures the organisation 
understand their requirements for how the IDS triggers must function. It also ensures that the 
organisation develops standards to guide the interaction between affected individuals 
(Jordaan, 2009; Rowlingson, 2004). 
An initial proposal in this study was to include the Escalation policy in this domain; 
however, half of the respondents felt that an escalation policy must reside within the realm of 
policies and therefore the Escalation policy was removed from this domain and moved to the 
Policy domain. However, this left a gap as this domain required an action that ensures that 
there is an escalation as certain incidents must be forwarded for formal investigations, based 
on the triggers created. However, this escalation is not aimed at any procedure but rather at 
answering the questions: when must we escalate (when) and if these requirements are met, 
what then (what to do)? This when and what will be answered by an element named 
Escalation criteria. The Escalation criteria sub-domain will effectively create the link 
between what and when (escalation criteria) and how (escalation policy). 
Figure 36 illustrates the refined elements of the domain. 
Monitor & 
report
Monitoring 
requirements
Tools
Monitoring 
report
Reporting 
criteria
 
Figure 36: Monitoring and reporting domain and elements (Source: Author). 
Cycle 
Although only one participant proposed a cyclical structure, it is apparent that such a 
structure will assist start-up organisations in organising themselves and prioritising pieces of 
work. The implementation of DFR should be incremental as the organisation continues to 
mature.  
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The proposed hierarchy is based on the Deming cycle of continuous process 
improvement (Deming, 1982). The four steps in the Deming cycle are: 
 Plan—planning the process of DFR. 
 Do—acting on the process. 
 Check— measuring the outcomes by discovering insufficiencies. 
 Act—acting on the gaps between target and achieved outcomes. 
The DFRCF-v2 will incorporate the Deming approach by illustrating where the domains are 
affected by the Deming cycle.   
Overall DFRCF Model 
Initially, eight domains (as part of the extended DFRCF-v1) were proposed, and post 
interviews had five new domains added to the model. The new domains and new sub-
domains are reflected in Table 34.  
Table 34 
New Domains and Elements Suggested by Participants  
New Domain name New sub- domains (elements) introduced Participant 
Group support Exco buy-in P1, P2 
Lab management Copies and standard build; Acquisition tool tests; 
Asset inventory 
P1, P2 
Auditing & logging Forensic findings; Event auditing; P1, P2 
Public relations & 
messaging 
Fraud awareness; Press statements P1, P2 
Risk Management n/a P4, P5 
The main objectives of Group support are to ensure that DF receives the high level support 
from senior members of the organisation needed to ensure that budgets are allocated and that 
prioritisation is encouraged. However, the initial proposed model made the executive support 
part of the DFR strategy element. The organisation that proposed the new domain is a very 
large international organisation and.it is understandable to see a separate focus for executive 
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support. However, smaller organisations do not have the complex management hierarchy that 
the very large corporates have and so, in this study, the initial proposal to include Executive 
support as part of the DFR strategy is supported.  
The above argument also applies to the proposed Auditing and logging and Public 
relations and messaging. The two new proposals do not warrant a focus as separate domains.  
The same argument holds true for the proposed Lab management. It will remain part of 
the Systems and Events domain. Further, as participant 7 (the most respected practitioner in 
the sample) reiterated, “They only set out rooms for laboratories in large companies and this 
is to test capacity not facilities”. Moreover, the sub-domains proposed under the Lab 
management domain are too low-level (detailed). The model must remain consistently 
medium-level (between high-level and low-level of detail).  
Risk management is an important aspect within any business and as such deserves a 
separate focus. The domain will remain Risk management. 
The final main domains are illustrated in Figure 37 below: 
Strategy
 
Legislation & 
Regulation
 
Legal
compliance
 
Governance Training
 
Systems & 
Events
Monitor & 
report
Policy & 
procedure
Risk 
management
 
Figure 37: Refined domains of DFRCF (Source: Author). 
Maturity Assessment Model 
For this study, the check-list approach model (see Table 36) was accepted as the final DFR 
maturity assessment model. The model visualises an approach that will assist organisations to 
assess their maturity levels. As earlier stated, this model is a prescriptive model as 
organisations can utilise it to plot a path towards higher maturity. The maturity levels were 
defined with the input of the forensic practitioners, thus strengthening the validity of the 
approach followed to define the maturity levels. 
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How to read and complete the assessment model 
The domains entity on the model illustrates which domains and sub-domains are applicable in 
relation to the maturity level. The domain field is left unpopulated in Table 35—this is to 
illustrate that the maturity levels are applicable to each/every/any domain and sub-domain. 
There are 5 levels of maturity in the model, which should be read from left to right, in a 
horizontal line. 
To achieve a rating of, for example, Level 2, the organisation has to comply with all the 
conditions mentioned under Level 2–Basic. If all the conditions have not been met, then the 
score will be lowered to the previous level, which is Level 1–non-existent. This trend should 
be followed consistently for all the levels, except for Level 1, since there is no level lower 
then Level 1. 
 
Table 35 
DFRCF Maturity Assessment Model  
Domains Maturity levels 
Major 
domain 
Sub 
domain 
Level 1: 
Non -
existent 
Level 2: 
Basic 
Level 3: 
Intermediate 
Level 4: 
Advanced 
Level 5: Full 
  
 No formalisation 
 As-and-when 
processes. 
 No documentation 
 No 
communication 
 No training 
 No regulation 
  
 Low 
formalisation 
 Repeatable 
processes. 
 Basic 
documentation 
 Low / informal 
communication 
 Informal training 
 Informally / ad-
hocly regulated 
 Standardised 
 Documented 
processes 
described in 
standards, 
procedures, tools, 
and methods. 
 Reviewed & 
accepted 
documentation 
 Communication to 
new staff on 
employment 
 Formal training 
 Formally regulated 
 Endorsed by 
Exco. 
 Process 
improvement 
measurements in 
place. 
 Documents 
aligned with 
goals & 
objectives. 
 Communication 
to all staff 
annually. 
 Formal training 
& accreditation. 
 Principles are 
carried out, 
monitored and 
regularly 
improved. 
 Endorsed by Exco. 
 Process improvement 
objectives for 
organization are 
established & effects 
of deployed process 
improvements are 
measured. 
 Changes to 
documents are 
incorporated & 
communicated. 
 Communication to all 
staff frequently. 
 Formal training & 
accreditation. 
 Legislations / laws / 
verdicts  are studies 
and incorporated into 
processes, documents 
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Conclusion  
Organisations that do not have a means to measure their forensic readiness run the risk of 
economic crime exploitation. This study examined current literature to understand what the 
DFR structure is and how such a structure can be used to design a maturity assessment 
model.   
The structure became apparent from an analysis of previously published literature and a 
qualitative approach was used to test the DFR structure with forensic practitioners. The 
respondents shaped the structure (domains) and the domains were used to create a maturity 
assessment model. Two approaches were proposed to participants, however, a third response, 
which is a combination of check list and qualitative narration, was also proposed by the 
respondents. 
Extended DFRCF Model V2–Post-Participant Input 
The final structure (domains and sub-domains) are illustrated in Figure 38 below. The figure 
demonstrates the scope and structure of DFR and is thus useful to financial services 
organisations that invest in DFR. The figure illustrated is the extended DFRC-v2 
framework—after it has been tested in the real world—and it mimics the Deming lifecycle: 
Plan, Do, Check and Act. This is the final product of the extended DFRCF in this study and 
this tested framework is introduced to the academic world and to the forensic practitioners. 
This framework will allow organisations to implement and manage their DFR 
programmes as it illustrates the scope of DFR and it achieves the goals and objectives of 
DFR, as postulated by the various literary works shown in Table 1 of this study. Thus, the 
post-alignment of some activities, such as the alignment of business goals to forensic goals 
and the alignment of business risk units with incidents monitoring units, will be avoidable 
(Whyte & Claims, 2012).  
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However the DFRCF-v2 is still a theoretical framework that must still be tested in 
practice – before generalisation of the framework (Karokola, Kowalski & Yngström 2013).  
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Figure 38: DFRCF-v2—post practitioner input. 
DFR Maturity Model 
There was a sufficient split in the responses of the participants when deciding which maturity 
model to use. Five participants preferred the check-list approach, one participant preferred the 
qualitative approach, and the remaining four favoured a combination of the two approaches. 
The check-list approach was elected, as the majority of the participants were in favour of this 
model. 
The final DFR maturity assessment model is illustrated by Table 35. This model is the 
first step towards calculating a maturity score. It is important for organisations to understand 
their forensics readiness capability as this will enable them to achieve and remain in a state of 
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true forensic “readiness”. An organisation that knows its readiness status is in a better 
position to manage and implement interventions that are aimed to achieve a maturity rating of 
5. 
However, the DFRMAM is still a theoretical model and its practicality must still be tested in 
the real world—before generalisation of the model. 
Summary  
The study understood that financial services organisations do not have access to non-
proprietary assessment models to measure the DFR, furthermore, organisations that do 
perform DFR assessments, utilise frameworks that do not exclusively satisfy the goals and 
objectives of DFR. 
To resolve this problem the study interrogated existing DFR frameworks to understand 
their structure (domains and sub domains). This interrogation led to the amendment of the 
DFRC framework. This process effectively resolved the second question of the research. 
Having understood the structure, the study investigated the goals and objectives of DFR 
to ensure that the extended DFRCF exclusively satisfies the goals and objectives of DFR. 
This effectively resolved the first question of the research.  
The study investigated maturity assessment models to understand if they can be utilised 
to assess DFR. The study found that none were suitable for this purpose and as such the study 
developed a maturity assessment model utilising the design principles. This effectively 
resolved the third and last (fourth) research questions.  
The study further tested the extended DFCRF and the DFR maturity assessment model 
by conducting semi-formal interviews with forensic practitioners. The final DFRCF mimics 
the Deming lifecycle in the fact that it has Plan, Do, Check and Act phases. This approach is 
not prevalent in existing literature. The strength of this framework is that it meets the goals of 
DFR, is modelled on the Deming cycle and has had a first iteration with forensic experts. The 
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model is re-usable across industries such as banks, insurance and forensic houses. The 
weakness of this framework is that it has not been extensively tested in the real world. Also, a 
better approach for data collection would have been a focus group, but as mentioned in the 
study this was not feasible due to time and budget constraints. 
The study proposed two approaches to the maturity assessment model, namely a bullet 
point approach and a qualitative approach. Most of the participants selected the bullet point 
approach. The participants also suggested a new approach, namely, a combination of the 
bullet and qualitative approach. The weakness of the chosen bullet point model is that it 
requires a questionnaire or checklist to guide in the calculation of a maturity level.  
All in all the research has answered its research questions and thus resolved the main 
problem.   
Recommendations for Future Research: 
In this study, the structure needed for DFR was investigated and how such a structure 
can contribute to the design of a maturity model was also examined. Both of these objectives 
have been met by this study; however, the maturity assessment model alone cannot 
sufficiently provide a maturity assessment. This study proposes that future research focus on 
designing a checklist, as mentioned in Appendix 4, to aid in the calculation of the maturity 
level. It is also recommended that practitioners and/or academics test both the DFRCF-v2 and 
the DFRMAM in practice—before generalisation (Karokola et al., 2013). 
Future research should seek to test the DFRCF extensively in the real world and should 
consider developing a combination maturity assessment model, as suggested by this study. 
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS—Domains and sub-
domains  
 
Question 1:  
Find the above domains. How would you improve on them and can the sub-domains be 
further refined? 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS—Model and Assessment 
Matrix 
Check-box approach 
Domains Maturity levels 
Major 
domai
ns 
Sub 
domai
ns 
Level 
1: 
Non-
existe
nt 
Level 2: 
Basic 
Level 3: 
Intermediat
e 
Level 4: 
Advanced 
Level 5: Full 
  
 No 
formalisati
on 
 As-and-
when 
processes. 
 No 
document
ation 
 No 
communic
ation 
 No training 
 No 
regulation 
  
 Low 
formalisation 
 Repeatable 
processes. 
 Basic 
documentation 
 Low / informal 
communication 
 Informal training 
 Informally / ad-
hocly regulated 
 Standardised 
 Documented 
processes 
described in 
standards, 
procedures, tools, 
and methods. 
 Reviewed & 
accepted 
documentation 
 Communication to 
new staff on 
employment 
 Formal training 
 Formally regulated 
 Endorsed by Exco. 
 Process 
improvement 
measurements in 
place. 
 Documents aligned 
with goals & 
objectives. 
 Communication to 
all staff annually. 
 Formal training & 
accreditation. 
 Principles are 
carried out, 
monitored and 
regularly improved. 
 Endorsed by Exco. 
 Process 
improvement 
objectives for 
organization are 
established & 
effects of deployed 
process 
improvements are 
measured. 
 Changes to 
documents are 
incorporated & 
communicated. 
 Communication to 
all staff frequently. 
 Formal training & 
accreditation. 
 Legislations / laws / 
verdicts  are 
studies and 
incorporated into 
processes, 
documents 
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Qualitative approach 
Major 
domain
s 
Sub-
domain
s 
Level 
1: 
Non-
existen
t 
Level 2: 
Basic 
Level 3: 
Intermediate 
Level 4: 
Advanced 
Level 5: Full 
  
No 
DFR 
strateg
y in 
place. 
There is an 
undocumente
d tacit 
strategy that 
is 
communicate
d informally 
and ad-hocly. 
Documented 
strategy 
endorsed by 
the executive 
management. 
It is 
communicate
d to IT / 
Forensic staff 
when joining 
the 
organisation.  
 
 
Documented 
strategy 
endorsed by 
the executive 
management, 
highlighting 
the goals and 
objectives. It 
is 
communicate
d and made 
available to 
all staff at 
least once per 
annum. Staff 
are aware and 
know where 
to find the 
strategy. 
Documented 
strategy 
endorsed by 
the executive 
management, 
highlighting 
the goals and 
objectives. It 
is made 
available and 
communicate
d to all staff 
regularly. 
Staff are 
aware and 
know where 
to find the 
strategy. 
Changes to 
the strategy 
and document 
are 
communicate
d to staff. 
Question 2:  
Find the above maturity model:  
1.1 Which maturity assessment model would you prefer and why?  
1.2 How can the maturity levels be further refined to illustrate an escalation from non-
existence to full maturity?  
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APPENDIX 3—INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
Interview 1 of 2 with Old Mutual Practitioners 
 
 
Recording:   OMFIPR01  
Site:    Pinelands, Old Mutual building, participant meeting room  
Data collection method:  Formal interview 
Data collection date:  15/08/2012 
Data collector(s):  Ivan Claims    
Transcriber:   Ivan Claims 
Start time:   15:00 pm 
End time:    15:08 pm 
I:     Interviewer 
R1:    Respondent one  
R2:    Respondent two  
 
 
1  [small talk]  
 
-- (Question 1: Find the above domains: how would you improve on them and can the sub domains be 
further refined?) -- 
 
2 I: I emailed this [Pointing to the domain and sub domains on the projector] just to give you  
3  guys a heads up. I made this very simplistic. There is a lot we can discuss and honestly I-.  
4  I feel eager about this but do realise you guys have a lot of other work. I can honestly sit  
5  here and keep you guys busy for half a day, but I thought to keep it simple so I can also  
6  move ahead with my research. So these are the domains and sub domains [Pointing to the  
7  projector]. What I mean by domains and sub domains…when I went into literature …  
8  uhm…there are certain elements or certain things that stand out, that kinda need to be in  
9  place for a company that are considering DFR for example. One of those things was  
10  strategy, the other was legal requirements, then would be your governance, and then  
11  would be your policies, your compliance, and training, and monitoring and reporting.  
12  Now if I look at the first domain: strategy. Pieter Grobler , et al, they have published a lot  
13  of material concerning DFR , so one of the things they do mention is for example is your  
14  organisation structure, you need to have an overall DFR strategy, I think at corporate  
15  levels. And if you have other departments or units that also need to have a DFR strategy  
16  or strategic plan that is aligned with the overall strategy. Also there are objectives and  
17  goals that need to be factored in based on the overall DFR strategy. You also have to  
 
XYZ 
XYZ 
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18  have some sort of methodology that needs to identify some sort of evidence collection  
19  need. In other words do you really need evidence, what kind of evidence, what kind of  
20  systems  [Unclear]. So this is what I’ve done similarly with legal requirements. They have  
21  broken this down into legislation, laws, and judiciary requirements. Now judiciary  
22  requirement I can understand. What I understand from that would be…If there was a  
23  court case pending between an organisation and someone else…uhm…you know,  
24  because of forensic reasons. Whatever the verdict that might have come out of that, that  
25  kind of verdict needs to be studied and to see whether that is something that needed to be  
26  changed with in the organisation. One has to be cognisant of the verdicts that come out of  
27  those trials and assessments based on that. Of course we know there are certain  
28  legislations and certain laws, I don’t know whether these per say could possibly be  
29  grouped together and just say…laws and regulations. Or would you want to put them  
30  separately because we might have different understandings of that. And of course you  
31  would have your business requirements, whatever business requirements you have one  
32  need to take…take…you know in cognisance the legal and judicial requirements based on  
33  that as well. Similarly with governance, you know we have to have governance controls,  
34   there has to be an evidence collection plan, and there has to be like an incident cost  
35  technique. Just to make an example…I mean you have to find out- First and foremost  
36  before you instigate an incident investigation find out whether it is feasible to go ahead  
37  or not. For example if it was like R500 and your investigation is going to cost more than  
38  that… really do you want to do that…but for you to be able to asses that you need to have  
39  a cost technique involved with that. Similarly with your systems and events. That’s your  
40  systems, your infrastructure, your networks, your risk assessment, your events and your  
41  laboratory. I’ve never seen a laboratory before and I was hoping at some stage you could  
42  show me what is going on there, but typically these are the kind of things and  
43  organisation would have to go and identify and be aware of. What I’ve also heard…what  
44  I’ve seen is that actually do talk about some laboratories that have to be certified. I don’t  
45  know if you guys have heard about that?. Uhm. Where you actually go for some  
46  certification because apparently that helps with…if you go and you submit your evidence  
47  in court…you know that kind of gives you a heads up. 
 
--5 minutes into the interview -- 
 
48 R2: That helps if you’re a private company, and you need to show to clients that you have a  
49  certain level of expertise and equipment. You say okay I’m ISO 9000 compliant. Cause  
50  the client also has an obligation from their side. You know…we will only do business  
51  with vendors who are certified, whatever, whatever. 
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52 I: Ok 
53 R2: Internally, I don’t think the law requires that the lab itself be certified. 
54 R1: I think certifications are more appropriate to training aspects, so individuals could be  
55  certified regardless of your tools and environment. If an individual has a certain level of 
56  certification that says yes maybe I don’t have [Unclear] I know enough to make sure the  
57  evidence is not contaminated. So you can mitigate. Cause some of those certification  
58  criteria just doesn’t make sense in our environment. 
59 I: When you say our environment, do you mean South African environment…or? 
60 R1: Corporate environment. 
61 R2: Corporate environment   
63 R1: I can understand that Scotland Yard…whatever might, but for 90 cases out of a 100 that  
64  just turns into a disciplinary, I don’t see why every time I must rebuild my system…clean  
65  and all that. It just doesn’t make sense. 
66 I: Yes 
67 R1: The software wouldn’t really allow cross contamination of evidence and-. In a  
68  disciplinary that discussion goes away very quickly. 
69 I: Ok 
70 R1: It’s not like a major court case, where-. Yes I would rather- 
71 I: uhuh 
72 R2 Maybe if I can start commenting.  
73 I: Ok 
74 R2: This whole-  well not completely yet. Alot of what you put there [Pointing to the domains 
73  and sub domain on the projector] the way we work…is not necessary the way all  
74  companies work, but digital forensics is a sub component of a forensic perspective. So to  
75  say you have a default strategy is absolutely meaningless in our environment.  
76 I: Ok 
77 R2: We’ve got a forensic need and similar to handwriting experts, or lie detection, what’s the 
78  word, but these kinds of functions. Digital forensics is actually just another specialist kind 
79  of tool that the forensic investigator makes use of. 
80 I: Ok 
    
[Interview 1 was permanently disrupted by the device. See interview 2 for the continuation of the 
conversation] 
    
-- End of the interview which lasted 7:37 minutes -- 
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APPENDIX 4—DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS CHECKLIST 
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